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Polarity and peacekeeping: The effect of the international structure on United Nations peacekeeping missions

Abigail Appleton

The American University in Cairo

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

POLARITY AND PEACEKEEPING:
THE EFFECT OF THE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE ON UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

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Chapter One: Introduction, Definitions, and Literature Review

According to a Senior United Nations (UN) Official, the reputation of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) rises and falls with the Congo.[1] Peacekeeping has been defined by Congo and the three missions that have focused on the country. The conflict in DRC continuing is not due to a lack of attention from the United Nations and specifically DPKO as recent mandates for the UN's Intervention Brigade demonstrate. However, DRC continues to score one of the lowest placements on the Human Development Index, ranking 186 out of 187 in 2014, up from the lowest rank in 2013.[2]

This same UN Official argued that the UN cannot fix all the societal problems that exist in DRC; it is up to the Congolese as individuals and their government. The UN can only help, but the UN system has neglected conflict prevention. DPKO asks for funds to support peacekeeping in DRC and more recently receives the amount requested, but the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) is denied the entirety of their request to address political issues in the country.[3] The conflict in DRC has passed the point at which peacekeeping funds can resolve the country's issues. The Intervention Brigade, while successful in combating rebel movements, is not equipped to deal with the governance problems that DRC must fix.

Another Senior UN Official who has worked for the UN since 1981 questioned the resources used by peacekeeping missions and argued that missions have lost their original rationale and become wasteful.[4] Moving forward, the international community must deal with the world as it is, not as it ought to be. The post-Cold War reality is one in which the UN needs U.S. support to do anything related to peace and security. The

[1] Interview with a UN Senior Official, interview by Abigail Appleton, January 8, 2015.
[2] United Nations Development Programme, "Table 1: Human Development Index and Its Components," *Hdr.undp.org*, 2014, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components.
[3] Interview with a UN Senior Official, January 8, 2015.
[4] Interview with a UN Senior Official, interview by Abigail Appleton, December 4, 2014.

pursuit of international peace and security would be better off if the interest of the U.S. can be attracted in areas where the U.S. doesn't see a national interest: "There is no issue in the Security Council that doesn't have the imprint of the U.S."[5] If one accepts this statement, it follows that the structure of the international system plays a large role in the performance of the UN in general, and UN peacekeeping missions specifically.

The end of the Cold War produced a significant shift in the structure of the international system. It also witnessed an increased use of peacekeeping as a mechanism to deal with conflicts. This increase is often attributed to a supposed "changing nature of conflict," where intra-state war has become more common than the classic inter-state war and conflict has become more violent, brutal, and complicated. However, these descriptions leave important aspects of peacekeeping operations unexplained. For example, Fearon and Laiton demonstrate there was no actual rise in the frequency of civil wars after the end of the Cold War. Instead, they show that conflicts of the 1990s were actually protracted and had existed since the 1950s and 1960s.[6] Yet it is only after the end of the Cold War that the United Nations mandated specific peacekeeping operations to deal with these protracted conflicts. How do we explain why these protracted conflicts suddenly received this level of attention by the international community? If the conflicts themselves did not change in significant ways, does the change in the international structure—as Neo-realists claim—explain the change in the international response?

The number of United Nations peacekeeping missions increased from 16 missions during the Cold War (1956-1990) to 50 after the end of the Cold War (1991-2014).[7]

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[5] Ibid.

[6] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 01 (2003): 88, doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534.

[7] While 16 peacekeeping operations were mandated between 1956 and 1989, the Security Council has authorized 50 mandates since 1991, with 2 observer missions deployed in 1948 (UNTSO) and 1949 (UNMOGIP). These two observer missions will not be considered within this thesis.

Fifteen of the early missions were aimed at conflicts that included two or more sovereign states. The mission to the Dominican Republic in 1965 was the only Cold War era mission aimed at addressing a solely intra-state conflict.[8] Following the Cold War, peacekeeping mandates targeted conflicts between and among sovereign states, but were also broadened significantly to include 35 mandates directed at intrastate conflict within 22 different sovereign states (see Appendix A). Mandates also became broader to include new operational goals.[9] Most missions during the Cold War were observer missions or truce supervision missions; peacekeepers were unarmed and those who were lightly armed were tasked with monitoring and reporting on the activities within and between parties. In contrast, the post-Cold War decades have included missions to assist government transitions, observe elections, observe humanitarian assistance, and monitor and report on human rights.[10]

The "changing nature of conflict" as argued by the UNHCR[11] and theorized by Mary Kaldor's "New Wars" theory,[12] attempt to explain the increased number of conflicts and depth of the international response to conflict. The UNHCR argues that the nature of conflict has changed in the way civilians are affected, displaced, and killed. Their 2000 publication *State of the World's Refugees* acknowledges the historical danger to civilians caught in conflict's wake and even acknowledges the role of bipolar competition in

[8] The categorization of ONUC as addressing an interstate conflict is contested. The table in Annex A includes the explanation that categories are based on the mandate that established the mission. ONUC, as explained in Chapter Three, was established as a response to the Congo state's request for assistance from Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold to address Belgium's reentry into Congo. Without the interstate issue, ONUC likely would not have been established.
[9] "History of Peacekeeping: Post Cold-War Surge," *Un.org*, accessed February 17, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml.
[10] For example, UNTMIH and MINURCA were mandated to assist in government transitions in Haiti and the Central African Republic; UNTAET and UNTAC were mandated to observe or organize elections in Timor Leste and Cambodia; UNCRO and UNSMIS were mandated to observe humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia and Syria; and UNMIL and UNMISS were mandated to monitor and report about human rights in Liberia and South Sudan. These examples are not an exhaustive list, but serve to illustrate the ways and places in which mandates have been expanded beyond truce supervision.
[11] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 276–280.
[12] Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford University Press, 2007).

holding local conflicts at bay, yet still argues the conflicts of the 1990s represent a change in the way conflict occurs.[13] Kaldor argues that during the 1980s and 1990s, a "new" form of war emerged in the context of globalization. Kaldor presents an argument that violence and war has changed in form, actors, function, and funding. War and conflict is observed to be more violent and more ruthless than in decades past. Proponents of New Wars theory argue that there are higher casualties, particularly in civilian deaths, and an increased displacement of civilians.[14] Actors within conflicts are no longer limited to states but include non-state actors including private military companies. According to the theory, the purpose for wars changed significantly as there is an increase of intrastate conflict. Funding is no longer left to each side of a conflict, but sponsors are more readily found to support each side.

This study offers an alternative to "changing nature of conflict" theories. If conflict has indeed become more violent and brutal, the "changing nature of conflict" could explain the increase in United Nations peacekeeping missions since the end of the Cold War. However, these theories lack the historical evidence to support that conflict has changed significantly in the last two decades. Many intrastate conflicts of the 1990s have origins in the 1950s and 60s attributable to post-colonial weaknesses.[15] Additionally, Edward Newman argues that the changes in the nature of violent conflict have less to do with the reality of the conflict than the increased attention being paid to aspects of these "changes" by academia.[16] Advanced weaponry and increased ability to communicate has contributed to the evolving nature of conflict, but this contribution is

[13] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *The State of the World's Refugees*, 276–280.
[14] Siniša Malešević, "The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts," *International Political Sociology* 2, no. 2 (May 14, 2008): 98, doi:10.1111/j.1749-5687.2008.00038.x.
[15] Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," 88.
[16] Edward Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 179, doi:10.1177/0967010604044975.

not a new phenomenon. The scale of violence has changed; the idea and goals of violence has not.[17] Newman points out that it is the analysis of conflicts, including the goals of combatants, their methods, and their financing, that is new. By applying these new perspectives to more recent wars, the analyses suggest that these conflicts are different today than they were in the Cold War era and before.[18] In other words, it is the *analysis* of the causes and effects of conflict that has undergone significant change, not the way violent conflict is carried out. To focus on identity, ethnicity, religion, and the like in the context of today's conflicts and claim that these ideas were not relevant to those involved in conflict before the 1990s is to ignore and dismiss the multiple underlying causes of conflict at anytime. A better explanation is needed for the international community's increased intervention in conflicts.

Research in International Relations, peacekeeping and conflict resolution, and, to a lesser extent, military studies have analyzed important aspects of the international structures and causes of conflict,[19] but the link between the international structure and peace remains undeveloped. The change in the international structure of the Cold War and post-Cold War eras will be explored as an alternative explanation for the change in

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[17] In *Man, the State, and War*, Waltz explains that the development of modern technology, particularly with transportation and communication, have allowed states to grow larger than early political theorists would have though possible. In talking about state functions, he notes that, "The scale of activity has changed; the idea has not" (177). The concept that the scale of activity will change, but the idea remains intact is one that I argue applies to any concept that is affected by technological change. This includes violence, conflict, war, and peace.

[18] Newman, "The 'New Wars' Debate," 174.

[19] John S. Dryzek, Margaret L. Clark, and Garry McKenzie, "Subject and System in International Interaction," *International Organization* 43, no. 3 (July 1, 1989): 475–503, doi:10.2307/2706655; Jang Hyun Kim and George A. Barnett, "A Structural Analysis of International Conflict: From a Communication Perspective," *International Interactions* 33, no. 2 (2007): 135–65, doi:10.1080/03050620701277764; Dieter Senghaas, "Conflict Formations in Contemporary International Society," *Journal of Peace Research* 10, no. 3 (January 1, 1973): 163–84, doi:10.2307/422770; Jennifer De Maio, "Is War Contagious?: The Transnationalization of Conflict in Darfur," *Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association*, Annual Meeting 2009, 1; Susan Olzak, "Does Globalization Breed Ethnic Discontent?," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 3–32, doi:10.1177/0022002710383666; Björn Hettne, "Security and Peace in Post-Cold War Europe," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 3 (August 1, 1991): 279–94, doi:10.2307/424408; Hyung Min Kim, Deokro Lee, and Richard C. Feiock, "Network Power and Militarized Conflicts," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 291–317, doi:10.1177/0095327X11410857.

the international response to conflict. Kenneth Waltz defines structure as the arrangement of units within a system.[20] There are three considerations for defining the arrangement: the hierarchy or lack thereof, the assorted functions of the units, and the distribution of capabilities among the units.[21] Any variation in the hierarchy, function, or distribution will affect the processes carried out in the system. Peacekeeping, as a process, tool, and institution, has changed. The effect of structural changes may explain the increased attention on protracted conflicts that arose in the 1990s and the actions taken to end these conflicts peacefully.

The primary question answered in this thesis is: How does change in the international structure affect United Nations Peacekeeping operations? This general research question raises a number of sub-questions:

- How did the international structure influence UN Peacekeeping operations during the Cold War?
- How did the international structure change at the end of the Cold War?
- How did UN peacekeeping missions change at the end of the Cold War?
- How might UN peacekeeping function in a multipolar structure?

Given the focus of this thesis on United Nations peacekeeping, the remainder of this work should be read in such a way that all references to peacekeeping missions and action are meant as peacekeeping performed by the United Nations. Peacekeeping has evolved beyond the United Nations and if non-UN peacekeeping actions are being discussed, it will be explicitly stated as a non-UN peacekeeping action.

This thesis will argue that the bipolar international structure of the Cold War placed restrictions on the way United Nations peacekeeping was created and performed. The end of the Cold War and the consequent changes in the international structure

[20] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 1st ed. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Pr Inc, 2010), 81.
[21] Ibid., 81–82.

explain the shift in peacekeeping that occurred in the 1990s. As the structure of the international system has continued to evolve in the 21st Century, peacekeeping has also shifted. The institution of peacekeeping, itself a response to conflict by the international system, has become what it is because of the changes in the structure of the international system. Any future shift to a bipolar or multipolar structure will again affect the way peacekeeping functions.

International Systems

International systems have been a common theme within IR literature for over a century. Robert Jervis notes in 1979 the then commonly accepted "loose" definition of international system is the "environment in which states operate."[22] He proposes instead that an international system exists when two conditions are present. First, the actors must be interconnected in such a way that the actions of one actor will affect the actions of another. Second, the behavior of the system must be independent of the expectations and priorities of the individual actors within the system.[23] Waltz, also in 1979, very simply defines a system as a structure and interacting units.[24]

The realist view of the international system dominated from the end of World War II through the Cold War. Proponents of the realist view commonly utilized the illustration of states bouncing off each other like billiard balls.[25] Pluralists like Burton instead utilized the image of cobwebs that cover and link areas of the world.[26] These competing views of the international system have been debated since the 1960s

[22] Robert Jervis, "Systems Theories and Diplomatic History," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 212.
[23] Ibid., 212–214.
[24] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 79.
[25] Barry Buzan and Richard Little, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 27.
[26] Ibid.

highlighted by disagreements about the actors who must be recognized and the activities that are performed within the international system studied by IR scholars.

Keohane and Nye detail the differences between the realist and pluralist approaches in their book *Power and Interdependence*. The pluralist approach described by these scholars is referred to as complex interdependence and mirrors realist characteristics of the system with three alternative characteristics. The realist system, defined by Keohane and Nye, is recognized as made up of rational unitary States that place military issues above economic and social issues in a hierarchy and identify the use of force as a legitimate and effective tool of policy.[27] Keohane and Nye alternatively present the actors within complex interdependence as dependent on the nature of connectivity of the channels being considered: interstate channels are made up of unitary state actors, transgovernmental channels are made up of non-unitary state actors, and transnational channels are comprised of state and non-state actors. Complex interdependence does not accept a consistent hierarchy of the issues but rather acknowledges the interaction between/among issues and how the issues influence conflict. Finally, force is not used when complex interdependence is in place because the dependence includes not only military issues, but social and economic issues as well.[28] Holsti argues that a system cannot exist without connection among a variety of units[29] and in this way, Keohane and Nye's articulation of complex interdependence serves to explain the behavior within the international system.[30]

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[27] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 3rd ed (New York: Longman, 2001), 20.
[28] Ibid., 20–21.
[29] Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 26.
[30] Keohane and Nye do not fully reject the Realist view they explain in their book. Instead they see the realist view and complex interdependence as "ideal types." They are opposites that will fluctuate in degree the manner in which situations are best explained. Some situations will be more accurately explained by realist assumptions, and other situations will be better described through complex interdependence.

Robert Gilpin offers a theory that assists in the understanding of rules within a realist framework. Rules enter Gilpin's theory as a component of one's ability to seek control in the international system. The *ability* to control the international system is rejected by realists and neorealists, but there are states that may be more successful in the attempt. The three components that converge in Gilpin's theory to assist this are power, or the ability to act; prestige, or the ability to make demands of others in the system that will be met; and a "set of rights and rules that govern or at least influence the interactions among states."[31] The rules mentioned in the third component fall along the three major lines of power: political (rules of diplomacy), military (rules of war), and economic. These rules can be based on a common set of values and norms. In this understanding of the international system, dominant states define and assert their rights and force their defined rights on lesser powers as rules and norms.[32] By doing this, dominant powers are advancing their individual interests. The rules and norms found in the system support the goals and interests of the strong states.

G. John Ikenberry offers an alternative theory of international order that does not assume the international system is based on anarchy, but instead proposes his ideal: a constitutional order rooted in a hierarchy. Ikenberry's theory likens the international political arena to a domestic political environment and asserts that political order originates in rules that members agree to and that "allocate rights and limit the exercise of power."[33] A constitutional order exists with three elements. First, the principles and rules of order are a result of shared agreements and these agreements form the foundation for participation and consent in the political order.[34] Second, the agreed to ruls and

[31] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Reprint edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 34.
[32] Ibid., 36.
[33] G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 29.
[34] Ibid., 30.

institutions "set binding and authoritative limits on the exercise of power."[35] Within this second element, Ikenberry argues that fundamental institutions have autonomy from the members whose consent allowed the institution to be created. Finally, the rules in an international constitutional order are not easily changed once they are established through consensus.

Ikenberry's contribution to International Relations theory is a bridge between neorealist and liberal institutionalists because Ikenberry recognizes the primary role power plays and argues that institutions create and sustain order in the system. Though he acknowledges power, he argues that

> "…power is restrained through binding institutions that tie states down and together, and thereby reduce worries about domination and abandonment. In this sense, constitutionalism depends heavily on the role of international institutions as shaping, constraining, and connecting mechanisms between states. It is precisely because institutions can in various ways bind (particularly democratic) states together, constrain state actions, and create complicated and demanding political processes that participating states can overcome worries about the arbitrary and untoward exercise of power."[36]

What he fails to explain is the motivation a hegemonic power, a state at the top of a defined hierarchy, has to create and agree to a constitutional order that restrains, limits, and potentially reduces its power at the regional, much less international, levels. His focus on Western and democratic states also limits the application of his argument to states that are neither Western nor democratic. Furthermore, the constitutional order Ikenberry describes in Chapter 6 of *After Victory* is more

[35] Ibid., 31.
[36] Ibid., 35.

applicable to NATO as an institution than any set of rules or institutions that represents a truly *international* system. Even the powerful hegemon in Ikenberry's ideal is not capable of controlling or establishing rules for the entire international system.

Kenneth Waltz proposes a theory of structural realism that expands the realist theory and continues to offer an alternative to complex interdependence. For Waltz, a system exists when units interact within a defined environment. Structure, Waltz argues, does not include any characteristics of the units that act within a system but must remain independent of these units. The structure defined by Waltz is the arrangement of that which makes up the structure. It is an abstract concept that includes the standards that dictate the organization of units: anarchy or hierarchy,[37] the multiple functions of the units, and lastly, and most important to this study, the distribution of capabilities among units.[38] The structure is necessary within a system because it is the structure that defines the environment in which units of the system interact. The structure determines the actions a unit may or may not be able to perform based on that unit's capabilities and placement. Structure cannot entirely prohibit some actions, but it will constrain weaker powers from being able to do everything they want. Structure is defined at a system level, not at the individual unit level.

Alexander Wendt criticizes Waltz's depiction of structure because it does not allow one to predict the behavior of units in the system. Wendt does contribute to the constructivist vision of structure by arguing that action of units is always directed "toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."[39] The structure stands independent of individual units by definition, but Wendt

[37] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 116.
[38] Ibid., 79–99.
[39] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (April 1, 1992): 396, doi:10.2307/2706858.

observes that a unit's behavior may be in response to the structure as much as it is in interaction with other units. Structure may be less susceptible to constant changes, but it is not immune to change and evolution.

An important aspect included in both Waltz's and Wendt's definitions of structure is the assumption of anarchy as the broad organization of units in the structure. The lack of an overarching authority in the international system contributes to the anarchy of the structure. Wendt's definition of structure is "anarchy and the distribution of power."[40] This definition is less specific than the definition offered by Waltz, but more inclusive than others that focus only on the distribution of power without the assumption of anarchy. In place of anarchy, other scholars have noted the structure defined by power distribution among/between poles, through the class relations and distribution of labor, or through a hierarchical balance of power. System structure is also closely related to the term interdependence, which is described above.

System structure was abandoned in the literature until recent years. Cooper, Hawkins, Jacoby, and Nielson studied the propensity of states to relinquish levels of their sovereignty to international institutions by considering how the structure of the international system encourages such a renouncing of sovereignty. They argue that states are willing to give up sovereignty to authoritative international institutions when two structural constraints are lessened. These constraints are the anarchy and self-help of the system, and the balance of power that is already in place. The constraints are borrowed from Kenneth Waltz who recognizes three parts of a system's structure: first, the ordering principle; next, the function of the units; and last, the distribution of capabilities among the units. Cooper et al. argue to use these categories despite the criticisms of non-realists

[40] Ibid., 391.

because they see the usefulness of Waltz's categories in making it easy to differentiate structure and actors.[41]

Kenneth Waltz is used in this work because his definition of structure offers a thorough view of the environment in which United Nations peacekeeping efforts take place. Waltz's definition of structure is not meant to define a theory of state behavior, rather, it is a component within his systems theory and serves to illustrate the arrangement of actors within the international system. The placement of the United Nations in the international system will be discussed more shortly, but for now, it is sufficient to state the United Nations is an international system-based organization. Waltz does not hold a favorable view of international organizations as actors because he argues it is only sovereign states that may be considered actors within the system. International organizations are controlled by and subject to the will of the states. The nature of the United Nations as an organization that includes most of the system's actors and operates at the system level makes the UN all the more susceptible to the will of the units that generate the structure. Waltz's definition of structure accepts this reality and allows the analysis contained here to be more useful in calculating the future of United Nations peacekeeping as the international structure may transform.

Although the structure of the international system supplies the foundation for the argument presented in this thesis, there is more to the story of peacekeeping than the structure of the international system. Within the broader system are ideas, norms, roles, and behavioral expectations that change and evolve independent of the structure. As the field of security studies grew, the concept of human security gained traction and norms emerged that placed an emphasis on human rights in a way that was not done previously. Rothschild begins her 1995 work on security by observing that all "large international

[41] Scott Cooper et al., "Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 3 (2008): 501–24, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00802.x.

conflicts" end with "a new political interest in principles of security."[42] Human security and the ways it can be and repeatedly is violated is a newer focus in Security Studies and International Relations. The concept is now part of the system of norms and reflects behavior that is expected and accepted in new understandings of the "international civil society" or "international community." The evolving idea of an international community, a system that includes nation-states as well as intergovernmental organizations, non-government organizations, corporations, civil society, the general public, and other non-state actors, has come, possibly, as a result of the transformation from the Cold War to post-Cold War eras.

A more robust exploration of peacekeeping would have to consider more in depth the effect of norms, ideas, roles, and behavioral expectations. As this is intended to be a modest exploration, the argument presented is meant to demonstrate the continued relevance of structural realism in the field of International Relations as one of the means of explaining conflict and peace. The rise of ideas, like identity, or norms, like human security, remains a relevant piece in the broader discussion despite their absence from the propositions and arguments proposed here.

Waltz's International Structure

Waltz defined international structure in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz's book proposes a structural theory of international politics that furthers realist assumptions. As stated previously, Waltz defines the international system as the units of the system and the structure in which they are arranged. The units of the system are states that are accepted as individual entities that pursue their "internally defined

[42] Emma Rothschild, "What Is Security?," *Daedalus* 124, no. 3 (1995): 53.

interests" of which the foremost interest is survival.[43] Structures are created by the interaction of its units and are distinguishable by their ordering principle, the differentiation and functions of units, and the distribution of capabilities among the units.

Ordering Principle

The ordering principle of a structure is either hierarchy or anarchy. Within a hierarchy, there is a super- and subordination of the units with clearly defined relations and interactions. The international system's structure is not a hierarchy. Instead, the principle order of the international structure is anarchy characterized by the absence of a central government. The principle action within anarchy is self-help,[44] which reinforces a general lack of cooperation between and among units. The units of the system define the anarchic structure and order it through their interactions, intentional and otherwise; however, no unit has the power or ability to control the anarchic structure. Once a structure has been established, the units are subject to its determination. The units may control their actions within the structure, but they are unable to control the consequences of their action. The structure becomes greater than the sum, and the wills, of its parts.

The number of great powers, or poles, will be a variation of the principle order even in anarchy. A change in the number of great powers will result in a change in the anarchic structure. The specific characteristics of the units, be they great powers or lesser powers, are unit-level or national level characteristics. These details are unimportant to and beyond the scope of the international-level structure. This is not to say that these details are unimportant at any time, but rather affirms that they do not matter when defining international structure. The actions and constraints of a bipolar system will differ from those of a multipolar system just as they will differ from that of a unipolar

[43] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 90–91.
[44] Ibid., 111.

system. These differences are a result of the structure that defines the placement of states within the system.

The anarchic nature of the international structure, particularly the concept of self-help, is an important idea in this study. The notion of self-help illustrates that the structure of the system does not encourage cooperation. Self-help is defined by high risk, and in the international political system, this risk lies in war.[45] Attempts to alleviate the risk of war require a state to trust that other states will consider collective security interests above individual security interests. However, because no higher authority exists to compel units to act collectively, the uncertainty of cooperation furthers the self-help action inherent in the anarchic ordering principle. This study focuses on an action, peacekeeping, that is meant to bring a permanent end to violent conflict and war. In the anarchic structure, self-help complicates peacekeeping because the action is taken collectively but the units continue to value their self-interest above the collective security action.

Differentiation and Function of Units

The differentiation and function of units defines how units are recognized within the system and how these units are similar and different. The primary unit within the international system is the state. A state-centric view recognizes that states are the only units whose interactions define the international structure.[46] Other actors may exist but are not recognized as units within the structure, and non-state actors are unable to contribute to the creation of the structure. International organizations are not units that stand independently within the structure. International elements of authority, found in international organizations, are grounded and closely linked to the units' capability that

[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid., 95.

provided the foundation for those elements to emerge.[47] More explicitly, the United Nations exists only so far as the states allow it to exist.

At the international level, units remain similar. The function of one state does not differ significantly from the functions of another. Each unit in the international system is sovereign and therefore expected to control its own internal and external affairs. Some states may be more dependent on other states, but a state's ability to define its interests and goals is retained. They are not necessarily free to do as they please, but they are free to make decisions, strategize, and run life within its borders as it decides and is capable of doing. *How* a state functions is not important to the international structure, but *what* the state's functions are is important to the international structure and remains consistent among all within the system. Each state functions to protect itself, its borders, and its interests to the assumed end of ensuring its survival. Their *ability* to perform these functions rests on the third component of structure: their capabilities.

Distribution of Capabilities

The distribution of capabilities establishes power in the structure. The specific functions of a state do not matter in the definition of international structure, but the ability to fulfill its functions is a direct result of their capabilities. States with more resources are better able to fulfill their responsibilities and functions. The capabilities themselves remain relatively undefined because capabilities evolve over time, but may include population, landmass, natural resources, money, military strength, political stability and specialized knowledge.[48] It is the distribution of these capabilities that establishes the arrangement of the units in the system. Units are arranged by what they have, not by how

[47] Ibid., 88.
[48] Ibid., 131.

or why they have what they have. As the distribution of these capabilities changes across time, the major states within the structure change as well.

Capabilities are economic, military, or political and each represents a different potential strength or weakness for any given state. The distribution of capabilities however must consider all capabilities because it allows one to measure "consequential states."[49] Waltz states, "In a self-help system, the possession of most but not all of the capabilities of a great power leaves a state vulnerable to others that have the instruments that the lesser state lacks."[50] Major states are considered such because of their ability to withstand the actions of other states. These major states on the other hand are able to influence the economic, military, and/or political actions of weaker states because weaker states are more dependent on those more powerful.

Waltz argues that dependence between and among nations is relative to the structure at the time.[51] Two states of relatively equal capabilities may be mutually dependent on each other in their interactions, while two states of unequal capabilities will have a lopsided relationship: the stronger influences the actions of the weaker because the weaker is more dependent on the assistance of the stronger. In the latter, changes in the relationship will affect a stronger state far less than it will affect and possibly endanger the weaker state. Dependence, and conversely independence, of capabilities may be predicted based on a state's placement in the structure. Major states are states with higher economic, military, and political capabilities that can be more independent and self-sufficient than states with fewer capabilities.

Waltz addresses economic, military, and political effects in three separate chapters of *International Relations Theory*, but each must be taken in light of the others. A state

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *International Security* 25, no. 1 (July 1, 2000): 33.
[51] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 157, 145.

with tremendous economic capability but lacking military or political strength remains influenced by those with perhaps less economic capability, but stronger capabilities in military and political strength. For example, oil states in the Gulf have tremendous economic capability, however, these states remain weak militarily and politically and therefore maintain lower positions within the structure. The capabilities of a state must be considered as a whole allowing the structure to remain defined by system-level analyses.

Three Structures

When defined by the distribution of capabilities, the structure is categorized by the number of states that possess the largest amassed capabilities. The concentration of capabilities in one state, a pair of states, or three or more states defines the polarity as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar respectively. In any structure, cooperation is low because of the nature of self-help. In this way, any structure works against peacekeeping; however, different structural arrangements place different constraints on the way peacekeeping is mandated and carried out. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how the shift from the bipolar structure that bore peacekeeping's early years to the unipolar structure in place since 1991 has also shifted the frequency and scope of UN peacekeeping mandates.

The primary motivation of any state, according to neorealist logic, is survival. The placement of any state within the structure will have a determining factor on the interests beyond survival that state may seek. A superpower, or consequential state, has an interest in maintaining the structure that allows them superpower status. As long as further dominance is not possible, superpowers desire the status quo and actively seek to ensure that the current structure is retained. To ensure that the current distribution of

capabilities is sustained ensures that superpowers place at the top of the structure. Waltz states that, "The stability of the system, so long as it remains anarchic, is then closely linked with the fate of its principal members."[52] This is not an absolute link because, for example, the multipolar structure may remain with the rise and fall of states in the system.[53]

The Bipolar Structure

A bipolar structure exists when two relatively equal superpowers maintain the primary positions within the system. These superpowers maintain their dominance through internal capabilities, not through external alliances or blocs. Cooperation between the two superpowers is low which means United Nations peacekeeping will require higher levels of agreement by the superpowers. Missions will be mandated only for conflicts in areas where:

i. The superpowers recognize "mutually strong interests,"
ii. The superpowers recognize one has "unambiguous predominant interests," or
iii. The risk attached to the failure to cooperate is higher than either is willing to take.

The latter is far more ambiguous and difficult to define, and often may only be recognized after the fact. However, based on the assumption that peacekeeping is only possible in a bipolar structure when one of these three situations is recognized by both superpowers, it may be predicted that bipolar structures will have fewer mandates that require (and allow) less of peacekeepers, which necessitates less actual cooperation in high politics.

[52] Ibid., 162.
[53] Ibid.

The Unipolar Structure

The only structure that allows a superpower the freedom to pursue more robust changes to units below is the unipolar structure. A unipolar structure exists when one state dominates in capabilities at a level that is unmatched by any other state in the system. A unipolar superpower's efforts to ensure its own survival work by default to ensure the survival of the system's structure. The self-help system of the anarchic order creates an environment in which the superpower may take responsibility for correcting instability within the lesser powers in a seemingly altruistic manner. The superpower's altruism is a myth, however, because expanding its presence in conflict areas is another way for the superpower to access more power, further ensuring its survival at the top. There is also a tendency for peacekeeping in a unipolar structure to lack the full support of the major power and only receive their rhetorical support. When a peacekeeping mission falls into this category, the rhetoric of support from the superpower is motivated not by norms or expected behavior, but by maintaining or increasing power and prestige.

Peacekeeping missions in a unipolar structure will be far more frequent and the mandates will be more robust because the superpower can make it so. However, this does not mean the resources will be available for the robust mandates because the superpower's motives may be based on the potential for relative gains in power and prestige. International organizations are at risk of being used and recognized as a tool of the superpower because the resources available to the international organization by doing as the superpower demands are necessary for the survival of the organization. The weight of the superpower will allow it to expand its unilateral reach into areas under the auspice of a multilateral institution. This is not to say that all peacekeeping missions that are mandated under a unipolar structure are masked unilateral action, but rather recognizes the power of the sole superpower to take action that would not be possible with the

presence of another state at the top. The fewer superpowers in the system, the more peacekeeping will serve the interests of the country at the top.

The Multipolar Structure

A multipolar structure exists when there are three or more units with relatively similar capabilities recognized as strongest in the system. This structure has not existed since the end of World War II, though arguments have been made since the end of the bipolar system of the Cold War that a multipolar structure is inevitable. At the present time, and in this work, it is accepted that a multipolar structure has not yet taken effect. Obviously, United Nations peacekeeping in a multipolar structure cannot be studied directly, but it is possible to make predictions about how peacekeeping would be mandated within a structure of multiple superpowers. It is proposed that a multipolar structure will have fewer and less robust mandates, more like the bipolar structure. However, the reasons for these fewer and weaker mandates, as compared to a unipolar structure, further differentiate the multipolar structure and the bipolar structure.

A structure of multiple superpowers is far less stable for the superpowers to work for their survival or the survival of the current structure, and trust among powers to cooperate would be less. When great powers agree to collaborate, peacekeeping will not be provided at the level that would be needed. The lack of trust and cooperation will result in fewer mandates that most likely will not include the strength or duties necessary to be effective. Furthermore, there is a higher probability that the mandates will not receive the material support from all superpowers as would be needed. The more superpowers in the system, the higher probability that peacekeeping will be suboptimal.

The United Nations

Since this work focuses on United Nations peacekeeping, the context of the United Nations and its placement in the international system is necessary. The United Nations charter was signed in 1945 during a conference in San Francisco. The charter itself was written through discussions that occurred during conferences held by the three major Allied states beginning in 1944. The failures of the League of Nations were addressed in discussions about the new federation, and its creation was also motivated by considerations of what the world order should look like following the end of World War II. The idea of the United Nations and the evolution of the organization appears to be a strong supporter of liberal political theory, however, the organization's origins were far more influenced by individual great power security concerns. Preparations for "the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security"[54] began after fourteen Allied countries signed the Declaration of St. James Place in June 1941 and after Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter on August 11, 1941. These agreements laid foundations for the U.S. and U.K. to begin exploring, separately, the creation of a post-war world order. The Soviet Union was invited to assist with the creation of the new world order as well.

The creation of the United Nations by the three strongest Allied powers shows the way in which collective security and collective interests will inevitably take a backseat to individual interests. The consideration of smaller powers was minimal, evident first and foremost from their lack of involvement until the great powers had already come to an agreement regarding the erection of the international organization. The fact that all three were recognized as powerful enough to establish such an organization solidified their role as a great power. The British influence internationally was waning, but by cooperating

[54] Atlantic Charter, signed by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, August 14, 1941.

with the rising and stronger powers of the Soviet Union and United States, the United Kingdom was able to secure a more powerful position than it would be able to assert on its own. Further, all three were able to be a part of defining the post-war system and the rules of international relations. They could establish rules that were beneficial to their individual interests. Finally, being instrumental in creating an international security organization meant that the great powers could fashion the organization in such a way that it could be used as a tool to promote their interests in the future. It was a strategy to ensure the power and capabilities of each state would not be as easily threatened.

Role of the United Nations in the International System

The United Nations has a place in the international system, but it is not a state. Therefore, it is not a unit and thus has no place or influence in the international structure. If we were to consider the United Nations a unit in the system, we would have difficulty explaining its structural placement. As defined by Waltz, the units in the international structure of an anarchic system maintain the same functions. The United Nations cannot maintain these functions. The United Nations does not have a territory to defend nor a population to govern. It would introduce an inconsistency in the function of units setting the United Nations on a different level. However, it is the distribution of capabilities that allows us to fully dismiss the possibility of considering the United Nations a *unit* in the system. The United Nations does not possess the ability to secure capabilities on its own. The organization relies on economic and military capabilities directly from its member states, and its political capabilities depend on the member states, particularly the major powers, to recognize authority in its decisions, resolutions, and sanctions. This recognition happens only when it serves the individual interests of member states. The United Nations is vulnerable because it relies on the units of the system to provide its

capabilities. If the United Nations were a unit in the system, it would not have the ability to ensure its own survival making it weaker than the weakest recognized sovereign state.

Waltz never addresses the United Nations directly in *Theory of International Politics* but he did not hold "central agencies" in high regard. Waltz argues that the greater freedom a state retains, the greater a central agency's insecurity will be. Cooperation is limited because a state's primary function is to survive; survival is made more difficult when one is dependent on another to ensure survival. Dependence is most easily avoided when one does not work with other states: if State A does not work with State B, it cannot become dependent on State B. In this way, states cannot enter into collective security agreements expecting full protection without also creating a central power strong enough protect all states. Power is not created out of nothing, and a strong central power in a collective security organization must have the resources and authority to make and enforce decisions. The central power of a collective security organization must retain the resources, authority, and power to protect its members. As power at the center of an organization increases, states have an increased interest in controlling it for their benefit. Such an organization has neither the authority nor ability "to act on *its own initiative*."[55] For this reason, Waltz argues creating a central government within an anarchic order is futile.

The purpose of the United Nations is not to form a world government, but instead to be the center for harmonizing attempts to maintain peace and security through collective security provisions, develop friendly relations among nations, and achieve international cooperation.[56] Despite the obvious differences in the purposes of the United Nations and the idea of a central government, the difficulties Waltz highlights in creating

[55] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 113. (emphasis added)
[56] "Charter of the United Nations," 1945, Ch. 1, Art. 1, 1–4, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.

a central government are quite similar to the difficulties the United Nations has faced in its attempts to fulfill its charter.

The anarchic self-help structure is one in which states are encouraged to work for their own interests and not those of another state nor for the preservation of the system. No state can be assured that other states will also work for the sake of the system and to risk one's actions for the good of all could mean disastrous outcomes for any state. A central government would require at least a minimum amount of authority for it to carry out its purposes; the authority of a central government would require individual states to forfeit some of their own authority. Additionally, in order for a central government to protect its patrons, it must retain enough power to make protection possible. Waltz points out that the more power is needed at the center, the more patron states will maneuver to control that power.[57] In the structural realist's understanding of the international system, non-state organizations are not able to work from their own initiative. It is not in a state's interest to give up authority to another state or organization nor is it in a state's interests to allow other states to control another state or organization. However, this is what would be required for a central government, or for an international organization such as the United Nations, to survive much less function effectively as an independent unit recognized within the international structure.

As stated, the United Nations was not created to be a central government. However, it has survived the bipolar structure of the Cold War, the unipolar structure immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the structure of today's system. The first way the United Nations can be understood within the system is acknowledging the UN provides a model of the international system that both reflects and reinforces its structure. It cannot be considered a unit within the system; it is instead an

[57] Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 112.

organization made up of nearly all units in the system. It is an attempt to codify and establish an "ideal" system of international relations, but in doing so, it fails to recognize the structural constraints that cannot be changed or controlled. The United Nations is vulnerable to the politics and power struggles of the international system in which it was created. In the UN, states are given a formal arena in which they may jockey for the upper hand. The creation of the United Nations immediately following World War II makes the organization a product of the War and has arguably cemented the strength of political capabilities maintained by the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, United Kingdom, China, and France, the permanent members of the Security Council (P5). The organizational structure of the United Nations gives the illusion of all states being equal in the General Assembly while the Security Council ensures the dominance of the stronger P5 states.

Second, the United Nations provides an arena where member states may coordinate collective action and perform under the unified umbrella of the organization. These actions, such as peacekeeping operations, allow member states to affect events and situations within the system. These actions are safer than if an individual state were to act on its own. There is an understanding of coordination that can increase the trust among states while also protecting states from conflict that would occur if states were working unilaterally. In this way, the United Nations serves the system as a tool to get things done. Stronger states are able to influence the things to be done by the United Nations apparatus; the more powerful a state, the more weight they have in affecting the actions and decisions of the United Nations.

However, the implementation of collective security through the design of the United Nations was made impossible before it could even begin. The ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the United States could no longer be ignored

after their common enemy was removed. Any reason to cooperate following the defeat of Germany, Japan, and the Axis states was gone. The bipolar system was established and collective security simultaneously floundered. Norrie MacQueen points out that collective security is "incompatible with the basic structure of international relations in a bipolar system."[58] One may argue the failure of collective security in the United Nations during the Cold War lies in the structure of the organization and the power given to the Security Council. It would be more accurate to say collective security failed because of the bipolar structure of the international system. At any time, and particularly during a time of conflict and staunch disagreement among states, it is irrational to expect any state to view a situation through any lens but their own. For the superpowers in a bipolar structure to set aside their interests for the sake of collective security would have required risking gain for the opposition. Personal interests remained prioritized above the interests of the collective group and above the interests of the system.

Shifts in the structure of the system do not create opportunities for the United Nations to operate independently. The role of the United Nations in a unipolar structure is even more subject to the will of the superpower because there is no power to offset the desires of the top state. Additionally, the organization will not be able to survive without the resources it receives from the sole superpower. Finally, a unipolar power would be able to act unilaterally even in cases that it cannot secure United Nations approval because no other states would be able to stop it either through United Nations processes or by circumventing those processes.

On the other hand, a multipolar structure would require greater cooperation among all powers in order to allow the United Nations to function. This cooperation would be less likely, as will be shown in the fifth chapter. Additionally, the multipolar

[58] Norrie MacQueen, *The United Nations since 1945: Peacekeeping and the Cold War* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999), 11.

structure has the potential to cause great difficulty for the United Nations since the organization is not capable of evolving to incorporate new "victors" or military powers other than the P5. We have yet to encounter an international system that includes a superpower or military power whose position on the Security Council is not yet well established through permanent membership, however, the onset of a multipolar structure does not necessitate that superpowers must be P5 members. It would be difficult to envision a multipolar structure in which a military power is willing to remain subject to Security Council decisions without insisting on the privileges afforded to those permanent seats. In order to survive, the United Nations would be forced to reform, add more permanent members to the Security Council, or risk operating as an organization that does not include the support of all military powers.

The United Nations Security Council and Collective Action

The theories and observations in Mancur Olson's seminal work *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* help to frame the view of collective action through the United Nations Security Council. A few underlying assumptions must be acknowledged from the beginning. First, peacekeeping is collective action. Because conflicts are interpreted as a threat to international peace and security, peacekeeping is an action taken by the collective whole of the UN to address this threat. Second, Mancur Olson's use of groups in his work better applies to international groups, like the United Nations, than to regional groups, like the African Union. Olson's theories consider groups that do not compete under larger governing bodies that can prohibit or influence the decisions and implementation of the organization's actions and decisions. In the same way, the UN, by virtue of representing nearly all nation-states, is not influenced by external actors in the way the African Union can be influenced by non-

African states and other more universal intergovernmental organizations. Third, because neorealist theory considers nation-states unitary actors, Olson's theory focusing on individual's actions based on rational behavior and individual interests can apply to the international system of individual nation-states. Finally, the United Nations, when focused on issues pertaining to international peace and security, provides collective action through the Security Council. For this reason, peacekeeping as collective action will be looked at as being provided by the 11 and now 15 member "organization" of the Security Council. This is necessary given Olson's distinction among individuals, small groups, and larger groups and will be explained further below.

Olson argues that any study of organizations must begin with its purpose.[59] The purpose of the Security Council is to represent the whole of the organization and act on its behalf "to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN…for the maintenance of international peace and security."[60] It is a common interest of UN member states to maintain peace and security, which is, in part, the reason the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom created the organization at the end of WWII. Olson further argues that group interests must be considered within the context of individual interests; individual interests will always trump group interests and altruism does not exist because any seemingly altruistic action will have a motivation based either on an individual interest or in response to a coercive action. Because collective action may only be taken with sufficient individual interest to see it through, any level of collective action is difficult to accomplish. This supports neorealist views as well since the self-help nature found in anarchy creates a lack of trust and discourages the cooperation necessary for collective action. This makes the collective action of peacekeeping at all incredibly unlikely.

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[59] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard Economic Studies, v. 124 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), 5.
[60] "Charter of the United Nations." Article 24, Para. 1.

Olson states that the logic of collective action requires two questions about the group to be answered. First, "will the group gain be maximized?"[61] and second, what is the size of each individual in the group?[62] In considering the first question, the group gain from providing a collective good is absolute: a collective good provided to all members at the level the group requires is an absolute gain *for the group*. However, group interests are secondary to individual interests. It is in each individual state's interest to receive the highest necessary amount of the collective good at the lowest possible cost. It is not in the interest of any individual state to provide more funds, lives, support, or other capabilities than the minimum necessary to receive its desired amount of the collective good. No one in the group has incentive to independently provide any more of the collective good once its individual cost provided the largest benefit it desired.

This is where the second question becomes important. The size of individual members impacts the burden carried by each in the provision of a collective good. When members are more equal in their capabilities, it is more likely that the collective good will be provided at levels less than necessary for the whole. When participation is voluntary, individual members will stop providing contributions for the collective good once they received the amount they need. While participation in the UN is voluntary to an extent,[63] the funding expectations are assessed according to member capabilities. However, as understood by Waltz, capabilities include more than economic strength. The provision of a collective good in the UN can also be provided suboptimally due to lack of political support. Collective goods, particularly for smaller organizations of relatively equal size and capabilities will face situations in which collective goods are provided at levels below what is best for the whole.

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[61] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 27.
[62] Ibid., 28.
[63] Participation in the UN is voluntary, but there is a coercive aspect promoting membership in the way a nation-state gains legitimacy and recognition in the international system by remaining a member in good standing.

The UN is a large organization with unequal member size and capability. According to Olson's theory, collective goods in organizations of greater degrees of inequality are more likely to be provided at levels closer to what is best for the whole, but at greater expense to the larger members. The Security Council is a smaller organization but represents the same inequality across member size and capabilities. The whole is represented, but there is more risk for suboptimal provision because individual interests still trump UN and Security Council collective interests. The unequal size of UN members means there is unequal gain received from the collective good provided by the Security Council. The United States requires more of a collective good to meet its needs than a country like Luxembourg would require. The United States would provide more capabilities necessary to acquire the good than Luxembourg would and Luxembourg will have a greater likelihood of having its interests in the collective good met than the United States would. Olson refers to this as the "*systematic tendency for "exploitation" of the great by the small*."[64] Smaller states do not need to contribute as much to receive its desired amount of the collective action. If a larger member would threaten not to contribute its amount unless the smaller member contributes more, the larger member would still benefit less than the smaller member. The larger member would also be at a higher risk of its contribution being negatively disproportionate to the benefit it gains. Using the U.S. and Luxembourg again, the U.S. loses more of its collective good than what Luxembourg would lose if the U.S. would contribute less because Luxembourg refused to contribute more.

The distinction of small groups from large groups in Olson's theory requires looking at peacekeeping as collective action decided by a smaller group, the Security Council, rather than a large group, the General Assembly. Because individual interests

[64] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 29. [Italics in the original.]

trump collective interests, the provision of collective action, specifically the maintenance of international peace and security, will be more likely to be provided through the Security Council than through the General Assembly. The Security Council represents all members of the General Assembly, but decisions made only represent 11 and now 15 individual member interests. The General Assembly represents the UN's interests as well as the individual interests of all 193 members. According to Olson's theory, "The larger the group is, the farther it will fall short of obtaining an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good. In short, the larger the group, the less it will further its common interests."[65] This is why the Security Council is argued herein to be a smaller organization relative to the entire UN.

The membership of the Security Council, and particularly the countries making up the P5, must also be considered in the inequality of capabilities and the provision of a collective good. Given the rotating membership of the majority of Security Council members, one could argue the permanent five members of the Security Council should be considered as the group providing collective action in the UN. However, it is not the case that Superpowers will already be members of the P5. The Security Council is not created in a way that allows new Great Powers to be included in the permanent members, which will have an effect on collective action through the UN if a non-P5 Great Power rises. An alternative, though not mutually exclusive, view of capability balance is that the equality of Security Council members is most evident by the structure and polarity of the international system. The unipolar structure would include a smaller organization, the Security Council, in an environment where there is the largest degree of inequality among members. The bipolar structure has slightly less inequality, and the multipolar structure

[65] Ibid., 36.

creates a Security Council with higher degrees of equality. The multipolar structure provision of collective action, i.e. peacekeeping, will be the most likely to be suboptimal.

Peacekeeping

The institution of peacekeeping has grown stronger and more influential within the United Nations system. Created in 1956 as a response to the Suez Crisis, peacekeeping has been utilized increasingly in world conflicts. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was created in 1992 and has controlled missions since this time.[66] Peacekeeping was initially centered on interstate conflict and hostilities. It was intended to stop hostilities or enforce ceasefire agreements, monitor to see troops were withdrawn, and place peacekeepers directly between militaries. The concept has evolved to include "human rights monitoring, monitoring and running elections, monitoring and training police forces, providing humanitarian assistance and assisting with the rebuilding of judicial institutions," in both interstate and civil conflicts.[67]

One complication within the institution of peacekeeping is that the UN Charter lacks any mention of the concept, but it is the language of chapters six and seven that allow peacekeeping to function. Missions are now categorized as consent based, falling under Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes, or peace enforcement missions that fall under Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. The difference between the two is that consent based missions are deployed at the request of the parties to a conflict while peace enforcement missions are sent by the UN Security Council whether parties to a conflict consent or not. Though

[66] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Department for Peacekeeping Operations: About Us," *Un.org*, accessed December 19, 2012, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/.
[67] Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature*," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2008): 285, doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.041205.103022.

not explicitly expressed in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has become a regular tool used by the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Despite the increased reliance on peacekeeping missions, the literature has not had a heavy focus in international relations. Early literature focused on the notion that peacekeeping is a tool of conflict resolution and conflict management that can be improved upon to become more effective and efficient. Case studies of early peacekeeping missions dominate the peacekeeping literature of the Cold War. Among the early literature, few titles will contribute significantly to this project except Indar Jit Rikhye's book *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping*. Rikhye, a retired Major General of the Indian Army, addresses the politics behind mandating UN Peacekeeping missions and argues that peacekeeping cannot be effective without the support of the parties to the conflict and the great powers. Without the support from these states, the problems of logistics, administration, and financing prohibit peacekeeping from being "a useful instrument to manage conflicts and provide a measure of security."[68]

Peacekeeping literature, much like the practice itself, changed with the end of the Cold War. Shortly after the Cold War ended, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* which redefined UN Peacekeeping and set the stage for the institution of peacekeeping to flourish. In their review of the literature, Fortna and Howard cite Boutros-Ghali's report as integral to defining the second stage of peacekeeping literature and missions stating, "There was a pervasive sense that finally, after decades of disagreement, the UN would be instrumental in resolving disputes across the globe."[69] However, the expansion of peacekeeping in the 1990s led to setbacks and failures that then dominated the literature. The format of the literature remained at practical or case study levels without theoretical or causal

[68] Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Theory & Practice of Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 246.
[69] Fortna and Howard, "Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature*," 287.

applications. Policy recommendations are numerous within the field, but attempts at comparing cases using more scientific methods are rare. Literature is heavily dominated by contributions that focus solely on one aspect of peacekeeping such as election monitoring, protecting human rights, or humanitarian intervention. Case studies of individual peacekeeping missions abound, as do works that address specific countries and their contributions to the international practice.[70]

Peacekeeping literature again changed following the 1990s which seemed to coincide with another UN report on peacekeeping in 2000: the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,* more commonly known as the Brahimi Report. Contributions of the last decade have introduced useful comparisons and scientific studies that analyze the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Fortna's book *Does Peacekeeping Work?* contributes findings that not only do peacekeepers seek the most complicated and dangerous conflicts, but their work will significantly increase the duration of peace in conflict areas.[71] Recent research trends have established the effectiveness of peacekeeping, but none have addressed peacekeeping as part of the international system or within the international structure. Peacekeeping is studied in and of itself, but the role peacekeeping plays within the system, interacting with other actors and institutions that have a place within the system is lacking in professional literature. This thesis addresses this gap in the literature by investigating how the international system may have affected

[70]Examples are numerous, but a sample would include: Laura Maria Herta, "Peacekeeping and the (Mis)Management of Ethnic Disputes: The Cyprus Case," *Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai: Studia Europaea* 57, no. 3 (2012): 59–76; Ray Murphy, "United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 8, no. 1 (March 1, 2003): 71–99, doi:10.1093/jcsl/8.1.71; David Curran and Tom Woodhouse, "Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone: What Can Africa Contribute?," *International Affairs* 83, no. 6 (2007): 1055–1070, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00673.x; Bhubhindar Singh, "Peacekeeping in Japanese Security Policy: International-domestic Contexts Interaction," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 3 (September 1, 2011): 429–451, doi:10.1177/1354066110364422; Kyösti Lehtomäki, Rauno J. Pääkkönen, and Jorma Rantanen, "Risk Analysis of Finnish Peacekeeping in Kosovo," *Risk Analysis* 25, no. 2 (2005): 389–396, doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2005.00597.x; A. Walter Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (2005): 7–32, doi:10.1080/11926422.2005.9673396.

[71] Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

United Nations peacekeeping with a particular focus on the number of missions and the scope of their mandates.

Bures calls for an increased consideration of international relations and conflict resolution theories into the study of peacekeeping and for creating theories specific to international peacekeeping. Contributing an extensive literature review of peacekeeping studies that have utilized international relations or conflict resolution theories, he concludes that theories within both disciplines have a lot to offer to studies of peacekeeping operations. In his call for international peacekeeping theories, he cautions going from one extreme to another and advocates creating "mid-range theories."[72] He goes on to specify six obstacles to developing such a theory or theories:

1. Terminology and classification regarding peacekeeping and the activities that make up peacekeeping are not uniform. The range in levels of analysis must be addressed and integrated. Additionally the complexity of evaluating peacekeeping operations must be dealt with so that study findings may be more consistent.
2. Evaluating peacekeeping missions differs depending on actors and their interests. The objectives of the mission should be treated independently from the values of the researcher.
3. Short-term and long-term issues must be addressed, and care must be taken to avoid "militarization of a society."
4. Methodological issues arise in creating baselines for comparison purposes to define what a successful peacekeeping operation is.
5. There needs to be a balance made between the conceptual and methodological considerations of peacekeeping studies.

[72] Oldrich Bures, "Wanted: A Mid-Range Theory of International Peacekeeping," *International Studies Review* 9, no. 3 (2007): 430, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2007.00697.x.

6. Each peacekeeping operation has its own uniqueness that would risk being oversimplified in attempts to combine all operations in a single study.[73]

The medium-range theory, which Bures advocates, would address some of the concerns raised about the oversimplification that would result from attempting to create a macrotheory. It also would allow patterns across different operations to be discovered more readily than is possible with microtheories.

The chapters that follow will present the argument supporting the argument that changes in the international structure explain changes in UN peacekeeping missions. Chapter Two will categorize the 66 missions since 1956 to show the extent of peacekeeping's evolution. The categorization illustrates how peacekeeping has changed as the bipolar structure gave way to the unipolar. Chapters Three and Four will look at three missions mandated to operate in modern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). ONUC is the focus of Chapter Three and is arguably the most complex Cold War era mission. Peacekeeping in a bipolar structure is explained through the events that led to and occurred during ONUC's mandate. Chapter Four begins with an explanation of the shift to the unipolar structure. The second and third missions to DRC, MONUC and MONUSCO, illustrate the changes that took place in the international system and the application of peacekeeping in the unipolar structure. In both Chapter Three and Four, the events described are considered from a multipolar peacekeeping perspective to show how the structure may have affected the mission and its mandate if it were not bipolar or unipolar. Predicting the course of events in a multipolar structure using the situations that occurred in the bipolar and unipolar structure is imperfect, but it does serve to show how differently the UN and Security Council would function in the multipolar structure. We know from experience that the UN and Security Council both operate differently in the bipolar and

[73] Ibid., 430–432.

unipolar structures, so it logically follows that the organization would be similarly affected by the multipolar structure. Finally, Chapter Five concludes with a summary of how each research question was addressed in earlier chapters. The concluding chapter will also explore how the propositions of peacekeeping in the bipolar, unipolar, and multipolar structures fared when applied in each slice in time.

Chapter Two: Categorization of Mandates—Current Observations

The exploration of the ways in which the structure of the international system affect United Nations peacekeeping missions could include a multitude of factors such as the number of mandates, scope of mandates, funding structures, leadership of missions, and troop and police contributing countries. Factors could further be expanded to look at conflicts since 1956 and explore the ways in which the structure prevented peacekeeping missions for conflicts during the time period. This thesis is focused solely on the number and scope of peacekeeping mandates and how these factors were affected by the shift from the bipolar structure to the unipolar structure. These are the factors that will be considered when imagining the role of UN peacekeeping in a multipolar world. Opportunities for further research remain to explore how the structure of the international system affects other factors that contribute to United Nations peacekeeping missions.

In order to draw conclusions about the effect of structure on the number and scope of mandates, all 66 missions from 1956 to the present have been categorized based on the structure of the system during which they were mandated, the type of conflict the mission was created to address (interstate vs. intrastate conflicts), the Chapter of the UN Charter under which the mission falls (Chapter VI vs. VII), and the overall activites of the mission as defined by the Security Council resolutions that established, renewed, or modified the mission. The data produced by creating these categories and defining missions based on their categorization will be used to show how the shift in structure of the international system led to a shift in the practice of United Nations peacekeeping. The shift in the number of missions is argued to be a result of the shift in the structure itself and will be argued based on the propositions presented in the first chapter of this thesis in Chapters Three and Four.

As highlighted in the introduction, 16 missions were mandated by the Security Council from 1956 to 1989 and 50 have been mandated since 1991; no new peacekeeping missions were created between 1989 and 1991. One bipolar structure mission was mandated to address intrastate conflicts while 15 were mandated to address interstate conflicts. Since the shift to the unipolar structure, 15 missions were mandated to address interstate conflict while 36 missions have been created to address intrastate conflict. The breakdown of the type of conflict, interstate or intrastate, may be found in the Appendix A.

The task of categorizing mandates of peacekeeping missions is one that requires generalizing the missions. Similarities among missions certainly exist, but each mission also has its own uniqueness that makes the act of simplifying missions a cause for critique. While acknowledging that generalizations may require over-simplification, care has been taken to include the widest assortment of categories for peacekeeping mission purposes. Missions fall under as many categories as are defined within the mandate of a mission. Care has been taken to consider the addition of mandates in subsequent resolutions of a given mission beyond the resolution that establishes a mission. Every mandate given to a mission, regardless of the resolution in which that task originated, is included in the chart below; in some missions, this includes more mandated functions than what was included in the resolution that established a mission. The evidence offered to show the complication of mission mandates across time is obvious, and there are many instances in which the lines between categories are blurred. Because of this, it is important to have very clear definitions of the categories so that the missions are classified clearly according to the language in the Security Council resolutions that establish peacekeeping missions and their mandates as well as the Reports of the

Secretary-General that further define a mission's mandate. The twelve categories are defined as follows.

Cease-Fire

A cease-fire, truce, and armistice are agreements established for the purpose of creating a cessation or suspension of hostilities. Many peacekeeping missions have included one or more of these terms making a very clear purpose for many missions to end violent action between and among combatants or against civilian populations and act as a buffer between parties. Missions that include a mandate to observe, enforce, secure, impose, monitor, or supervise an active cease-fire agreement are included in this category. This category also includes missions mandated to observe or enforce a demilitarized zone or terms of disengagement even if the term cease-fire is not explicitly used or a signed cease-fire agreement is not in effect.

Security

The provision of security is an important aspect in many peacekeeping missions. This category includes any mandate to provide security, military or police services, manpower for observation posts, buffer zones, patrol areas, prevent fighting, or supplement the maintenance of law and order. This also encompasses missions mandated to create a safe or secure environment for the purpose of fulfilling the mandate. To be included in this category, the mandate must have instructions for the UN peacekeepers to provide this security themselves as opposed to working under the security apparatuses already in place in the conflict area.

Confidence-Building

The confidence-building category is a broad category. However, the category is meant to include any action that serves to increase the legitimacy of efforts to end a

conflict. Trust is a necessary aspect in healthy relations among states or parties that interact. In conflict settings that receive United Nations peacekeepers, that trust is often weak if it exists at all. The United Nations adds credibility and serves to further legitimize the efforts of parties to resolve a conflict. This category includes missions mandated to investigate violations of an agreement or other wrongs committed; ensure, supervise, or confirm the withdrawal of foreign actors or money; enter into confidence or authority building activities for a government; ensure that an agreement has been implemented fully by all parties; or monitor mass media for incitement. This category does not include increasing the legitimacy or credibility of elections or referendums because those mandates are included in the *Elections/Referendums* category (see below).

Border Monitoring

Peacekeeping missions that include a mandate to monitor a border or ensure that no illegal infiltration of people or arms across borders occurs, including monitoring the adherence to an embargo, will be included in the *Border Monitoring* category.

Humanitarian Efforts

Humanitarian efforts include ensuring or delivering access to food, water, medical or emergency services, and other necessities to ensuring sustainable living. Peacekeeping missions that include a mandate to support, supply, engage in, assist, monitor, or promote such humanitarian efforts will fall under this category.

Human Rights

Human rights are an important aspect in peacekeeping missions and those missions mandated to observe, protect, or report violations pertaining to human rights are included in this category. This category will also include the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in former-conflict areas.

Elections/Referendums

This category includes any peacekeeping mission that has been given responsibilities directly related to the running of an election or referendum. This does not include responsibilities toward creating a secure environment in which an election or referendum may take place; these responsibilities instead fall under the *Security* category. Instead, it includes tasks such as registering voters, observing, monitoring, conducting, verifying, or certifying an election or referendum and its results.

Security Sector Reform

Security Sector Reform includes any mission that is mandated to oversee, monitor, observe, advise, train, or assist the military, gendarmerie, or police force in a conflict area.

Justice System Reform

This category includes peacekeeping missions mandated to oversee, monitor, observe, advise, or train the justice sector including the courts, judiciary, or prisons.

DDR, DDRR, DDRRR

Peacekeeping missions fall into this category when mandated to assist, observe, monitor, supervise, or control the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and/or resettlement of former combatants.

Mines

The *Mines* category includes missions tasked with assisting, monitoring, promoting, encouraging, or overseeing demining activities. It also includes missions mandated to train or educate civilians regarding mines.

Economic Recovery or Development

Missions with a mandate explicitly stated to assist, promote, foster, or perform coordination for development or economic rehabilitation are included in this category.

Table 2.1 includes the breakdown for each of the 66 peacekeeping missions mandated since 1956 by all 12 categories. Missions whose mandates are based either initially, through renewal, or through modification with reference to United Nations Charter Chapter VII are noted with an asterisk (*). Finally, a column and row is included for all missions and categories noting the number of categories in the mandate and number of missions tasked with activities under that category respectively. For a list of all peacekeeping mission names, their acronyms, and start and completed dates, see the table in Appendix B.

Table 2.1: Breakdown of UN Peacekeeping Missions by Category

UN Mission	Cease-fire	Security	Confidence-Building	Border Monitoring	Humanitarian Efforts	Human Rights	Elections/ Referendum	Security Sector Reform	Justice System Reform	DDR, DDRR, DDRRR	Mines	Economic Recovery/ Development	Total
UNEF I	■	■											2
UNOGIL		■	■	■									3
ONUC	■	■	■										3
UNSF		■											1
UNYOM	■		■										2
UNFICYP	■	■			■								3
DOMREP	■												1
UNIPOM	■		■										2
UNEF II	■	■			■								3
UNDOF		■											1
UNIFIL		■	■										2
UNGOMAP			■			■							2
UNIIMOG	■	■	■										3
UNAVEM I			■										1
UNTAG	■	■					■	■					4
ONUCA	■		■							■			3

UNIKOM*	■	■											2
MINURSO	■	■	■			■	■						5
UNAVEM II	■		■				■	■					4
ONUSAL			■			■	■						3
UNAMIC	■										■		2
UNPROFOR*		■			■	■		■					4
UNTAC	■	■	■			■	■	■		■	■		8
UNOSOM I*	■	■			■								3
ONUMOZ	■	■	■		■		■			■			6
UNOSOM II*		■	■		■	■		■	■	■	■		8
UNOMUR			■	■									2
UNOMIG	■		■			■		■					4
UNOMIL	■		■		■	■	■			■	■		7
UNMIH		■	■					■					3
UNAMIR	■	■	■		■	■		■		■	■		8
UNASOG*			■										1
UNMOT	■		■							■			3
UNAVEM III	■	■	■		■		■	■		■	■		8
UNCRO*	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■		■		9
UNPREDEP		■			■	■		■					4
UNMIBH*						■	■	■	■				4
UNTAES*			■			■	■	■		■	■	■	7
UNMOP										■			1
UNSMIH			■					■				■	3
MINUGUA	■									■			2
MONUA*	■	■	■		■	■		■		■			7
UNTMIH		■						■					2
MIPONUH								■					1
UNCPSG								■					1
MINURCA		■					■	■		■			4
UNOMSIL	■		■		■	■		■		■			6
UNMIK*	■	■	■	■						■			5
UNAMSIL*	■		■					■		■			4
UNTAET*		■	■		■							■	4
MONUC*	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■			9
UNMEE*	■		■		■	■					■		5
UNMISET*		■	■					■					3
UNMIL*	■	■	■		■	■	■	■		■			8
UNOCI*	■	■	■		■	■	■		■	■			8
MINUSTAH*		■	■		■	■	■	■	■	■		■	9
ONUB*		■	■	■	■		■			■			6
UNMIS*	■		■			■		■		■			5
UNMIT		■	■		■	■	■	■	■			■	8
UNAMID*	■	■	■	■	■	■		■	■	■			9

MINURCAT*		■	■		■	■		■	■				6
MONUSCO*		■	■			■	■	■	■	■			7
UNISFA*		■	■		■			■			■		5
UNMISS*		■	■			■		■	■	■	■	■	8
UNSMIS	■		■		■	■							4
MINUSMA*		■	■			■		■		■	■		6
MINUSCA*		■	■	■	■	■	■	■		■			8
Total	34	41	48	8	26	29	19	34	10	27	12	6	

While many observations may be drawn from this table, most striking is the number of categories attached to missions mandated under a bipolar structure and the increased number of categories attached to missions mandated under the unipolar structure. The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which was responsible with overseeing a ceasefire and monitoring elections in Namibia beginning April 1989, is the only mission between 1956 and 1990 that was mandated to perform activities across four categories, the most categories in a bipolar international structure. Nine of the twelve categories are included in mandates during the bipolar structure, but four of the categories are only mandated once, while a fifth is mandated twice. Since the shift to the unipolar structure, four missions have been mandated to conduct activities across nine of the twelve categories and nine missions have been mandated to conduct activities across eight of the twelve categories.[74] The average number of categories

[74] The four missions that include nine categories are: the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) from May 1995-January 1996; the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) from November 1999-June 2010; the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from June 2004-present; and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) from July 2007-present. The eight missions that include eight categories are: the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from March 1992-September 1993; the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) from March 1993-March 1995; the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from October 1993-March 1996; the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) from February 1995-June 1997; the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from September 2003-present; the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) from April 2004-present; the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) from August 2006-December 2012; the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) from July 2011-present; and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) from April 2014-present.

included in mandates from 1956-1990 was 2.25. The average number of categories included in mandates since 1990 is 5.08.

Another observation that can be made within the shift is the number and frequency of Chapter VII authorizations for peacekeeping missions. The denoted asterisks pertain only to missions specifically authorized to act under Chapter VII in one capacity or another.[75] Most likely, the first observation to be made is that the first mission to authorize activities under Chapter VII of the UN Charter was also the first mission to be mandated after the shift to a unipolar structure. No peacekeeping missions mandated in the bipolar system authorized the use of force as allowed in Chapter VII; all missions from 1956-1990 were authorized under Chapter VI only. Beginning with UNIKOM in 1991, 27 missions have been authorized under Chapter VII to use force if necessary in one capacity or another. Those 27 missions, the resolutions that permitted the mission to use force under Chapter VII, and the resolutions that established their mandate when it was not the initial resolution, appear in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: Missions Authorized under Chapter VII

Mission	Chapter VII Authorization Established by Resolution (Year)	Established by Resolution (Year) (If not the same)
UNIKOM	689 (1991)	
UNPROFOR	**836 (1993)**	**743 (1992)**
UNOSOM I	**794 (1992)**	**751 (1992)**
UNOSOM II	814 (1993)	
UNASOG	915 (1994)	
UNCRO	981 (1995)	
UNMIBH	**1088 (1996)**	**1035 (1995)**
UNTAES	1037 (1996)	
MONUA	**1173 (1998)**	**1118 (1997)**
UNMIK	1244 (1999)	

[75] In effect, this means that a mission such as the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG) is included as a Chapter VII mission even though the mission is only authorized to utilize Chapter VII force for "aircraft flying to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the purpose of conveying UNASOG" (S/Res/915 (1994), paragraph 4). The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) is not included as a Chapter VII peacekeeping mission because the reference to Chapter VII was to allow the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), a mission operating in the CAR separately yet cooperatively with the UN mission, to "ensure security and freedom of movement of their personnel" (S/Res/1159 (1998), paragraph 6).

Mission	Chapter VII Authorization Established by Resolution (Year)	Established by Resolution (Year) (If not the same)
UNAMSIL	**1289 (2000)**	**1270 (1999)**
UNTAET	1272 (1999)	
MONUC	**1291 (2000)**	**1279 (1999)**
UNMEE	1320 (2000)	
UNMISET	1410 (2002)	
UNMIL	1509 (2003)	
UNOCI	1528 (2004)	
MINUSTAH	1542 (2004)	
ONUB	1545 (2004)	
UNMIS	1590 (2005)	
UNAMID	1769 (2007)	
MINURCAT	**1861 (2009)**	**1778 (2007)**
MONUSCO	1925 (2010)	
UNISFA	1990 (2011)	
UNMISS	1996 (2011)	
MINUSMA	2100 (2013)	
MINUSCA	2149 (2014)	

The data indicates that a shift in the peacekeeping did take place and it coincides with the shift from the bipolar to unipolar structure. In the following three chapters, the practice of peacekeeping within each structure type, bipolar, unipolar, and multipolar, will be explored in more detail. Each chapter will build on the individual propositions detailed in the first chapter that peacekeeping will be mandated and performed in different ways depending on the structure of the system. By exploring how peacekeeping is mandated and performed in each structure, it will be shown that the increase in peacekeeping missions in the unipolar system was due to the shift in structure and was not due to an increase in the nature or brutality of violent conflict. We turn first to the bipolar structure and the peacekeeping mission in the Congo established in 1960.

Chapter Three: The Bipolar Structure and ONUC

This work argues there are three ways a peacekeeping mission may be mandated in the bipolar structure: first, the superpowers recognize "mutually strong interests;" second, the superpowers recognize one has "unambiguous predominant interests;" or third, the risk attached to the failure to cooperate is higher than either is willing to take. The creation of the first UN mission to the Congo cannot be explained by the proposition that there were "unambiguous predominant interests" recognized of one of the Superpowers: neither Superpower was willing to abandon potential influence in the politics of Africa. It then follows that the mission was created either as a result of the United States and Soviet Union recognizing "mutually strong interests" or because the greater risk was contained in the failure to cooperate in addressing the crisis in Congo. These two propositions are not mutually exclusive, and the argument that follows will show that, together, both explain United Nations action in Congo in the early 1960s.

Seventeen African states, including Congo, were decolonized in 1960. Congo covers one of the largest landmasses of any African state and is home to some of the most resource-rich land on the continent. For this reason, adding the newly independent Congolese state to one's Cold War sphere of influence would be desirable for either the United States or the Soviet Union. From its size and potential for wealth, a close and beneficial relationship between Congo and one of the Superpowers would spread that Superpower's influence not only into one African country, but also encourage a domino effect of influence in other African states. Using the United Nations to address the conflict in Congo was strategic: it allowed both the United States and Soviet Union to avoid direct confrontation over the states in Africa, while still allowing the potential to influence politics and policies in Congo. What actually transpired in the four years of the United Nations Operation in Congo, known by its French initials, ONUC, kept the

country out of the Cold War focus, although the United States continued to support Congo, which was eventually named Zaire, after ONUC left the country.

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Congo was ruled by Belgium during its colonial period. Belgium did not allow much time to plan for Congolese independence and the Belgian Free State, as it was recognized from 1884-1960, had been established in a way that ensured wealth and opportunity for Europeans rather than the native citizens. As a result of Belgium's oppression and marginalization of the local population, the leaders of the new African state were unprepared for the realities of maintaining the economic and political system they inherited. Complicating matters further, Belgium was not entirely willing to part with the power their rule of the territory allowed. It was not long after the independence ceremony on 30 June 1960 that the young country spiraled into chaos. Within two weeks, there was a mutiny against Belgian officers in the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), lawlessness in the country spiked as Belgian nationals and other Europeans were victims of targeted attacks, and Moise Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga province. The recently inaugurated President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba sent a cable to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in New York to request assistance from the UN. Kasavubu and Lumumba's request was intended to protect Congo's territorial integrity from the "aggression" of the re-entry of Belgium in the country which the Congolese government viewed as a violation of the Friendship Treaty signed with their former colonial power.

President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba led the two political parties that received the most support in the election that established the new Congolese state, however neither party was able to secure a majority. Kasavubu, a member of the Bakongo ethnic group, the largest group in the Leopoldville area and southern Congo,

was a strong nationalist.[76] He had been very active in the local government system that Belgium opened to the native Congolese in the 1950s. His nationalist style differed from that of Lumumba who was more charismatic and took a stronger pan-African stance. Unlike Kasavubu, Lumumba could not rely on his ethnic background for strength because the tribe from which he originated was not as large and occupied territory further from the Congolese capital, Leopoldville. Lumumba's support came from the Orientale province and other areas further from the capital. The power sharing established by the elections in May 1960 left Kasavubu in the President position, initially viewed as ceremonial, and Lumumba in what was viewed the stronger role of Prime Minister.[77]

Lumumba approached United Nations Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche, an American serving as Special Representative of the Secretary General at the time, to request UN assistance to train the ANC when Belgium sent their troops back into the independent territory,[78] but it was both Lumumba and Kasavubu who approached Secretary General Hammarskjold to request an intervention meant to address Belgian aggression against Congolese national territory. Hammarskjold responded by convening a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the issue on 13 July 1960. The Security Council's discussion on the matter resulted in the creation of a peacekeeping mission originally tasked to address the security situation in Congo and allow Belgium to leave the territory with its dignity intact.

Based on the request from Congo's leaders and the mission of the Security Council mandate, it would appear that the conflict in the Congo was an issue left from the colonial institution. In reality, there wasn't one single conflict in the Congo, but a multitude, all of which could be used and manipulated by internal circumstances and broader international interests. The Congo became an arena in which the Cold War

[76] Norrie MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960* (London: Longman, 2002), 37–38.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid., 39.

rivalries and interests were strained and tested. Cold War rivalries were apparent from the beginning of the mission. While both of the superpowers supported the creation of ONUC, neither power backed away from attempting to use the situation for gain in the broader Cold War conflict. The Soviet Union distrusted the neutrality of the United Nations, an organization the Communist power viewed as far too Western, but desired to pull the new African nation, and its wealth, into its sphere of influence. The United States, unsupportive of the colonial rule Belgium had exerted, desired an end to the Katanga secession and an opportunity to counter the potential Soviet influence in Africa. The special meeting of the Security Council that established the mission included tense moments and accusations from both Superpowers that the opposing power was interfering in the conflict to advance individual interests.

For example, one contentious issue was the request from Belgium to attend the Security Council meeting that established ONUC. The Superpowers did not disagree about Belgium joining the meeting and welcomed the former colonial power to be present, but rather they disagreed about the way to handle Congo's absence from the meeting. The disagreement was procedural: was it enough to allow Belgium to attend the meeting and not speak until it was known that the Congolese government had received the invitation to join and been given an opportunity to respond to it, or should Belgium not be allowed to attend the meeting until Congo was able to send a representative to join the discussion? The United States argued that the Congolese request sent to the Secretary General was for a UN force, that any delay to addressing the conflict could add humanitarian and economic disasters on top of the political issue, and that the discussion of allowing one or both countries to participate in the discussion was changing the focus to assessing blame for the current situation. The United States representative said

determining blame was "not only futile, but positively harmful."[79] The Council finally agreed to cable Congo to invite them to attend the Security Council's meeting and continue their discussion with Belgium present.

During the meeting, both Superpowers participated in back and forth attacks against the other. The Soviet Union accused the United States of attempting to stage a Western intervention into the Congo through manipulation of United Nations actions to address the situation. The accusation included suggesting UN Under-Secretary-General Bunche was working with the United States Ambassador to the Congo in Leopoldville to plan such an intervention.[80] The United States responded to the Soviet assertion, calling it slander and "an attempt at world domination in accordance with Marxism and Leninism by making just as much trouble as possible and making every bad situation worse as rapidly as possible."[81]

The Security Council meeting ran into the early hours of 14 July and, despite procedural disagreements and snarky accusations between the two Superpowers, the meeting concluded with the creation of the ONUC. The United States and Soviet Union both voted affirmatively for the mission while the remaining permanent members of the Security Council, France, the United Kingdom, and China, chose to abstain from voting.

Within two days of establishing ONUC, troops began to arrive in Congo, first from Ghana, and later joined by contingents from Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Morocco, and Tunisia; Sweden and Ireland provided troops and leadership as well.[82] While it may be argued that this was an early instance of utilizing African troops to address African problems, there was a strategy to employing African volunteers in a neutral United

[79] S/PV/873 para. 95.
[80] S/PV/873 para. 103.
[81] S/PV/873 para. 115.
[82] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 41.

Nations peacekeeping force: countries who supplied neutral peacekeepers were thought more likely to remain unavailable for involvement on the behalf of Congolese factions.[83]

As soon as ONUC began implementation, ambiguities and contradictions within the mandate began to affect the mission. The Security Council tasked the mission with providing military assistance until the Congolese government determined that their security forces were capable of continuing without that assistance.[84] The exact nature of the military assistance is not defined by the mandate, and this left the mission to figure out how to divide its tasks, and balance how much focus would be on the security it would provide in place of the national military and how much would be training of the national military forces. Ambiguities were created regarding the authority ONUC forces would have to provide and enforce security because of the lack of specification for what military assistance would be necessary and allowed. It was assumed, based on the request from Congo's leaders, that an intervention need only address the presence of Belgium in Congo and that peace would be restored with the departure of the uninvited Belgian troops. In reality, the Belgian troops leaving Congo was just the beginning; ONUC turned into a mission that flipped all prior assumptions of the role and action of peacekeeping through the United Nations upside-down.

Since peacekeeping had only been introduced four years prior to the beginning of ONUC, the practice had not been tested through anything as complicated as what happened in Congo. Dag Hammarskjold published his Summary Study in 1958 and this document was intended to define peacekeeping as a tool the UN could use to maintain international security. The Summary Study was based on the first two peacekeeping missions: UNEF I in Egypt and UNOGIL in Lebanon. Both of the peacekeeping

[83] Ibid.
[84] S/4383.

missions that began before ONUC addressed more straightforward and more easily controlled conflicts than what was going on in the Congo. Lumumba and Kasavubu requested military assistance to remove Belgian troops and restore security, but a significant problem with the mission was that security had disintegrated at the national level. Even after Belgian troops left the country at the end of August 1960,[85] Congo still presented a threat to international peace and security: the Katanga secession did not end, and the power sharing arrangement between Lumumba and Kasavubu was never stable to begin with.

Lumumba's expectation was that the United Nations peacekeepers would help address the secessionist movement, but Hammarskjold did not interpret that as being within the mandate of the mission. According to the rules established in Hammarskjold's Summary Study, the sovereign authority of the host state must be maintained and respected, and the UN is supposed to address the external aspects of a conflict only. The secessionist movement in Katanga was viewed as an internal issue that must be left to the Congolese to address. Beyond this misunderstanding, there were three instances in particular discussed below which challenged the mission. These events would challenge any mission regardless of the structure of the international system in which they occurred, but it is because of the structure that the responses to these events, and arguably the cause of the events, occurred as they did.

Lumumba's Death

The death of Patrice Lumumba is often attributed to a failure of the United Nations mission, which had been tasked with protecting Lumumba after internal politics jeopardized his position in September 1960. The internal politics were also affected by

[85] Jonathan E. Helmreich, *United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1998), 225.

the legitimizing role the United Nations plays from an international perspective. From the beginning, Lumumba clearly had the support of the Soviet Union, evidenced by Khrushchev's address to the General Assembly, also in September 1960. In Khrushchev's address, he repeatedly refers to Lumumba as the leader of the legally and legitimately elected government in Congo.[86] Lumumba also often employed a tactic of threatening to request help from the Soviet Union if the United Nations did not meet his expectations. He did not have the same level of support from the United States, and Lumumba's political alliances were closer with the Soviets than any Western nation. The United States strategically recognized this, and repeatedly encouraged the Congolese to accept aid and assistance through the United Nations, not through individual countries. The purpose behind this was always to obstruct the Soviet Union's ability to provide support to the nascent nation.[87]

The Soviets, however, did provide assistance to Lumumba, supplying planes and resources for the military operation Lumumba began in August to confront the secession in Katanga and Kasai. It was Lumumba's close relationship with the Soviets that prompted Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba from the position of Prime Minister in early September 1960, a declaration Lumumba argued was illegal and responded by dismissing Kasavubu. Kasavubu named a new Prime Minister, and the United States attempted to influence a vote of no-confidence in the Congolese Senate which would solidify Lumumba's removal.[88] However, the Senate vote of no-confidence failed and with that, Lumumba was able to secure the Senate's support.[89] The failing power-sharing arrangement came to a halt when Colonel Joseph Mobutu led a coup to install a technocratic government 14 September 1960. Mobutu was motivated by a desire to

[86] A/PV/869, para. 94–307.
[87] Helmreich, *United States Relations with Belgium and the Congo, 1940-1960*, 222.
[88] Larry Devlin, *Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 70.
[89] Ibid.

counter Soviet movement into Congo[90] but used the political stalemate between Kasavubu and Lumumba to justify his actions.[91] Kasavubu did not fight the action taken by Mobutu, but Lumumba refused to accept it leaving two groups claiming to be the legitimate leaders of Congo. Because of the way the situation developed and progressed, Lumumba was placed under the protection of the United Nations.

In early July 1960, before the Congolese leadership arrangement was jeopardized beyond repair, the Security Council advised that the General Assembly admit the Republic of Congo as a member of the United Nations. When Congo was admitted to the organization on 20 September 1960, there was not an internationally recognized government in Congo. A Conciliation Commission was created by the General Assembly to address the power struggle. However, this commission was not successful in bringing Mobutu, Kasavubu, and Lumumba together. In November 1960, the General Assembly officially recognized the government of Mobutu and Kasavubu as the delegation from Congo to the multilateral organization, legitimizing their leadership.[92] Following the General Assembly's decision, Lumumba escaped from his ONUC protection and attempted to return to his political supporters centered in Orientale province. Within four days of his escape, Lumumba was captured by troops loyal to Mobutu.

Lumumba provided a common enemy for Mobutu and Kasavubu in Leopoldville and Tshombe, the leader of Katanga province. Mobutu arranged in mid-January 1961 for Lumumba to be transferred to Katanga province. Lumumba was murdered within hours of arriving in Tshombe's territory.[93] ONUC was intimately affected by Lumumba's murder. The Soviet Union, upset with the way ONUC was implemented from the beginning, saw the death of Lumumba as highlighting the way United Nations actions in

[90] Ibid., 77–80.
[91] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 47.
[92] Ibid., 49–50.
[93] Ibid., 50.

Congo seemed to further the interests of Western nations. The growing Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations was also unhappy with the developments and it affected the contingencies operating within the peacekeeping mandate in the country: Egypt, Guinea, Mali, and Morocco removed their troops from the mission.[94] As difficult a position ONUC occupied in Congo, changes that occurred in the Soviet Union at the end of 1960 and the new Kennedy administration taking over in the United States in early 1961 created an opportunity in which both Superpowers were committed to seeing an end to the Katanga secession and restoring peace in a unified Congo.

Hammarskjold's Death

The Security Council handed an updated mandate to ONUC in February 1961 as a result of Lumumba's murder. Resolution 161 blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, permitting ONUC to use force "if necessary, in the last resort"[95] but did not employ Chapter VII. Additionally, the Security Council called on all foreign military, paramilitary, political advisers, and mercenaries not affiliated with the UN mission to leave Congo. The Soviet Union abstained from supporting the resolution, though did not prevent it with a veto, because it felt the updated mandate still did not go far enough to condemn Western imperialism.[96]

The third force commander, Conor Cruse O'Brien, Irish like the two before him, was named in June 1961. O'Brien took a liberal interpretation of the updated mandate. Ethnic tensions in Katanga led to violence and increased refugee movements that further threatened the humanitarian situation. The Mobutu and Kasavubu government named a new Prime Minister who took a strong anti-secessionist stance for which it requested further UN assistance to end. In response, the UN started Operation Rumpunch in

[94] Ibid., 51.
[95] SC/Res/161.
[96] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 52.

Katanga.[97] The Operation was successful in detaining foreign military operatives and mercenaries but was slowed when Tshombe committed to working with ONUC by expelling his foreign supporters. Instead Tshombe's commitment did not result in the detained soldiers being expelled from Congolese territory. When Tshombe and O'Brien were unable to find an agreement about accomplishing the mandate, O'Brien established a second Operation that would more forcefully remove foreign actors from Katanga. The second attempt at the Operation led to international criticism that fell along Cold War lines: Western media criticized the Operation for going too far, and the Soviet bloc criticized the Operation for not going far enough. The stalemate that resulted from the second Operation led to increased tensions, particularly within the UN where knowledge and approval of the Operation's plans and movement were disputed.

As stalemated yet intense fighting continued between Tshombe's troops and UN forces, Hammarskjold flew to Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia) to meet with Tshombe. As Hammarskjold's plane approached the runway to land, it tragically crashed and killed all the passengers on board. The exact cause of the crash has yet to be determined and has been the focus of UN inquiry, most recently in 2013.[98] The death of Hammarskjold helped set the environment that would eventually lead to the conclusion of ONUC.

Leaving Congo

U Thant, a Burmese national, was appointed Secretary General following Hammarskjold's death. The strategy of appointing Thant, a representative to whom the Afro-Asian bloc could relate, succeeded in removing barriers to cooperation in Congo.

[97] Alan Doss, "In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping and the Use of Force," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 5 (July 29, 2014): 709, doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.908284.
[98] Julian Borger, "Dag Hammarskjöld's Plane May Have Been Shot Down, Ambassador Warned," *The Guardian*, accessed February 7, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/04/dag-hammarskjold-plane-shot-down-mercenary-cable.

At this point, Superpower agreement regarding ONUC was no longer a result of fearing the risk attached to the failure to cooperate, but arguably results from mutual interests. Congo was no longer at risk of becoming a major battleground of the Cold War, and instead found itself the recipient of cooperation between the Superpower spheres, and the growing Afro-Asian bloc of UN member states. This newfound cooperation regarding Congo suggested the secession of Katanga would not last much longer.

The Security Council made a third significant update to ONUC's mandate in November 1961.[99] This resolution was meant to further aid ONUC in ending the "illegal" Katanga secession,[100] and gave the mission the power to remove all foreign military and mercenaries from Katanga using "vigorous action" and force "if necessary."[101] The secession did not end swiftly, but suffered through a year of fruitless negotiations. At the end of 1962, UN contingencies in Elizabethville (modern Lubumbashi) were attacked. ONUC responded and two days later took control of the city.[102] During the takeover of Elizabethville, ONUC personnel destroyed Tshombe's air force on the ground.[103] Two weeks into 1963, Tshombe officially ended the secession of Katanga and accepted the UN plan for reunification of the country. ONUC remained in the country for another 18 months, but with the end of the Katanga secession, the mandate established in the early hours of 14 July 1960 had been met.

Reimagining ONUC: The Multipolar Structure

If the 1960 Congo crisis had happened in an international system organized by a multipolar structure, the creation of ONUC would have been far less likely. In the bipolar structure, both Superpowers supported the creation of the mission, but the remaining permanent five members of the Security Council abstained from voting. If the United

[99] S/Res/169.
[100] S/Res/169.
[101] S/Res/169.
[102] Michael Harbottle, *The Blue Berets* (London: Leo Cooper, 1971), 56.
[103] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 57.

Kingdom, France, or China was recognized as a third Superpower, it is probable that their vote would have been a veto, preventing the mission's mandate. Alternatively, the discussion to secure their affirmative or abstained vote would have required far more bargaining than what existed in the already nearly seven hour meeting. Reaching consensus would be more difficult in the multipolar structure than the bipolar structure because more individual states would need to feel their interests were being met fully. There would be less incentive to work together unless Superpower interests were all aligned much more closely. Olson states, "…if there are many serious disagreements, there will be no coordinated, voluntary effort, but if there is a high degree of agreement of what is wanted and how to get it, there will almost certainly be effective group action."[104]

The other three events discussed in Chapter Three would also have been affected by a structure with more Great Powers. Lumumba's death may have been prevented with better protection and the United States would have felt less secure in the strength of its opposition to Lumumba remaining in power if another Superpower aligned with the Soviet Union. However, if the UK or France had been a third Superpower, Lumumba may have been murdered in similar fashion. The Katanga secession also may have been handled differently if there had been any disagreement about the necessity of keeping Congo unified. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union wanted Katanga to remain part of Congo, but if a third Superpower had opposed this, any action taken to keep Katanga in Congo would not have come from operations taken by the UN peacekeeping mission. The fighting between UN peacekeepers and Tshombe's troops would not have happened, and the Secretary General would not have died in a plane crash on his way to address the fighting. Finally, it is possible that ONUC, if it was established at all, would be more a failure in a multipolar structure than it is thought to be operating in a bipolar structure.

[104] Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action*, 59.

As it occurred in reality, ONUC kept Congo a unified country, but in a multipolar structure where a third Superpower could have shifted the power to affect change in the conflict, ONUC may not have been capable of saving Congo's territorial integrity. It would only have worked if individual interests of the Security Council members allowed working for the collective interest of containing the conflict in Congo. As the number of poles in the structure increase, the likelihood of meeting the collective interest decreases. Olson teaches us that the more equal the members of a group are, the less likely the collective gain will be optimal.

ONUC was in many ways an anomaly of Cold War peacekeeping missions. In the view of a United Nations Senior Official, the lack of success in Congo in the 1960s set UN peacekeeping behind by decades.[105] The mandate of ONUC included tasks that were not again seen until the bipolar structure gave way to the unipolar. The power granted to ONUC peacekeepers and use of force allowed within the mandate was very new, and the Security Council would not revisit the type of peacekeeping introduced in Congo until the Cold War was finished. The difficulties ONUC faced given the polarized Cold War environment challenged peacekeeping in a way that was not envisioned during the missions in Egypt (1956) and Lebanon (1958). As stated in earlier sections, peacekeeping was created, in part, as a tool to address the paralysis of the United Nations to utilize Chapter VII action to address threats to international peace and security. ONUC proved the tool imperfect and still susceptible to Superpower interests and individual politics. Congo posed a risk to the broader Cold War conflict due to the mutual interests both Superpowers held in the country. As the conflict progressed, the United States and Soviet Union converged with parallel interests of ending the secession in Katanga and allowing former colonial states to realize independence. The convergence allowed

[105] Interview with a UN Senior Official, January 8, 2015.

peacekeeping that attempted to address multiple dimensions of the conflict that otherwise would not have been addressed. It also showed shifting norms and roles as both consequential powers rejected the idea or norm of colonialism that had previously been accepted.

By the end of ONUC, Superpower cooperation could be better explained through mutually recognized interests. However, cooperation remained low and the ambiguities within the mandates existed in part because the Superpowers did not agree on the intentions behind the language in resolutions. The bipolar system affected ONUC in ways that a unipolar or multipolar system would not. It is to the unipolar system that this work will turn now.

Chapter Four: The Unipolar System and MONUC and MONUSCO

The United Nations left Congo in 1964 and did not return with a peacekeeping mission until 1999, nearly a decade after the bipolar structure gave way to our current unipolar structure. As we learned from Waltz, units in the structure are arranged by what they have. The Soviet Union's dissolution resulted in a changed distribution of capabilities among the unitary nation-states that remained. While Russia retained some of the influence over former Soviet states, it no longer possessed enough capabilities to be recognized as a great power. Russia was not as independent in the international system as the Soviet Union was. No state could compete at the level of the U.S., which left the U.S. as the only major power, officially shifting the international structure to a unipolar configuration.

In the 35 years between ONUC and MONUC (the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), it can hardly be said Congo experienced peace. Joseph Mobutu seized power from Joseph Kasavubu in November 1965. Mobutu changed the country's name to Zaire in 1971, and changed his own name to Mobutu Seso Seko in 1972. Mobutu was a close ally of the United States and was used in the Cold War to prevent any inroads for the communist threat in Central Africa. During Mobutu's misrule, he used the country's resources for personal gain while the economy tanked and the government did not provide for its citizens.[106] By the end of the Cold War, Mobutu was no longer valuable to the Western countries that supported him, and he found himself without international allies or support.

The road that led to MONUC's mandate, however, must begin in Rwanda and not with Mobutu's Zaire. The Rwandan genocide of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu government and Hutu militias in 1994 set in motion events that eventually led to the end of Mobutu's rule and the conflict MONUC was established to address. The Rwandan

[106] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 58–59.

genocide was a part of the Rwandan Civil War between the Hutu government's Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which began in 1990. Despite the presence of a UN Peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was established in late 1993, the genocide killed more than 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu in 100 days from April to July 1994.[107] Despite the incredible loss of Tutsi lives, the RPF proved victorious and the civil war ended in July 1994. The defeated Hutus, including former FAR and Interhamwe militia fighters, fled Rwanda and found refuge in UN camps in eastern Zaire where they began to organize and prepare cross-border attacks into Rwanda.[108]

By 1996, Zaire was home to rebel groups, not just from Rwanda, but from other neighboring countries such as Angola, Uganda, and Burundi.[109] These groups and, for some, their government sponsors, were able to take advantage of the lack of good governance and the security weaknesses in Mobutu's Zaire. Those groups and states that did not consider Mobutu an ally further leveraged the weakness of the Zairian state and created the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (AFDL) led by Laurent Kabila.[110] Though the AFDL was a conglomerate of nationalities and motivations, the strongest push against Mobutu within the AFDL came from Rwanda. Colonel James Kabarebe, former commander of Rwandan President Paul Kagame's guard, led the AFDL operations on the ground in Congo when the invasion to remove Mobutu, also known as the first Congo War, began in late 1996.[111]

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[107] Jason Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 15.
[108] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 86.
[109] Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 51.
[110] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 87.
[111] Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 120.

By the early months of 1997, the AFDL had overtaken key cities and areas in Congo and met little resistance in doing so.[112] In May, Mobutu fled his country to Morocco and Laurent Kabila assumed the role of President in the newly named Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The first Congo War finished with the change of leadership, but the region remained unstable as ethnic conflict intensified in Rwanda. Because of the violence during the first Congo War, refugees reversed their flow back into Rwanda during the fighting in late 1996 and early 1997. Adversaries of Kagame's rule used this influx of refugees to enter Rwanda causing increased violence at levels not seen since the genocide.[113] Kabila was untrusting of his former allies and convinced that he could be removed from power by Kagame's Rwandan power base teaming up with Congolese Tutsi, and responded by training former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) members at a military base in southern Congo.[114] The ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi in DRC continued and many Rwandan Tutsi in the Congolese army were deported and forced to return to Kigali beginning in July 1998.[115] Congolese Tutsis, and Tutsis who identified as Congolese, refused to leave and began to gather together for self-defense. Fighting between the Tutsi soldiers, including Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan citizens, and the remaining Congolese military began the evening of 2 August 1998, and with that the second Congo War began.

Within a few weeks, the South African Development Community (SADC) met to address the conflict. Though the SADC did not have quorum or the proper procedural mandate, it was decided that they would intervene to assist Kabila in his fight against

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[112] MacQueen, *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960*, 87.
[113] Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 181.
[114] FAR was the military of Rwanda that collapsed in 1994 shortly after the death of President Habyarimana. FAR was replaced as the national Rwandan Army by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), now recognized as the Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) when the RPF succeeded in its overthrow of the predominantly Hutu regime.
[115] Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 183.

"foreign aggression."[116] This action likely saved Kabila's rule in DRC; with the help of troops from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, the momentum of the Rwandan intervention was dampened though the conflict continued. It would still be another 15 months before the United Nations would address the conflict in DRC with a peacekeeping mission. The reason for this is in part due to the facts of the conflict, but also due to the direction peacekeeping took in the unipolar structure in the early 1990s.

The prediction of peacekeeping in a unipolar system, as detailed in the Introduction of this thesis, is that there will be more missions with more robust mandates. Furthermore, each mission would advance the national interests of the sole superpower. When a Superpower desires an intervention to address matters of international peace and security that is otherwise unpopular and not supported through the United Nations, the Superpower will likely conduct the action unilaterally, or by leading a coalition of the willing. Since the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the international system to a unipolar structure, there has been a significant increase in peacekeeping missions mandated by the United Nations. While each post-Cold War mission advances Superpower interests and mandates have grown more robust, proper funding and the provision of necessary resources to UN peacekeeping missions is commonly left wanting. This is especially apparent when the superpower's interests in improving peace and security within a conflict setting are not strong enough to support this improvement through unilateral action. The experience of MONUC and MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrate the way in which a peacekeeping mission, despite being given a more robust mandate, will experience significant challenges to

[116] Ibid., 197.

implementation if the Superpower's interests are not strong enough to fully support the mission's goals including personnel, funding, and rhetorical support.

The United States' interests in Africa since the end of the Cold War have been to maintain political stability. Economic development would be fantastic, but this is impossible without political security. The U.S. pays diplomatic lip service in saying that it is in the U.S.'s interests to see Africa as a continent of strong, economically viable, and peaceful countries, but in reality, the United States has not actively demonstrated a commitment to this rhetoric. Specifically in the Great Lakes Region, the United States' primary interest is not peace or prosperity, but stability. The first and second Congo Wars involved multiple countries in the Great Lakes Region, most notably Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. If the United States were honestly committed to the peacekeeping missions established by the United Nations, its actions would support the mission's implementation activities.

By sponsoring and "supporting" a peacekeeping mission through the United Nations, a sole Superpower is demonstrating a commitment to international peace and security and leadership in the international system. Without taking the lead to provide the resources necessary to implement those peacekeeping missions, a sole superpower is providing rhetoric of promoting international interests without following through with actions that would otherwise jeopardize national interests. For example, consider U.S. aid money to Rwanda. Rwanda has played a role in the conflict in DRC since the Rwandan civil war spilled into Zaire in 1994. The small country is impoverished and faces economic challenges that require foreign aid for development. Rwanda receives one of the highest aid packages in the world totaling 25% of Rwanda's GDP in 2003 and

2004.[117] The United States and United Kingdom are included in the list of countries contributing to Rwanda's aid donations, yet neither country attached expectations to their aid money.[118] The United States did not slow its aid to Rwanda until 2013 when aid was withheld because of Rwanda's support of child soldiers fighting with M23.[119] The defeat of M23 cannot be attributed in full to Rwanda ceasing its funding and support of M23, however, it played a role. If the U.S. was serious about supporting UN peacekeeping missions, the aid given to countries that are parties to a conflict would not contribute to perpetuating the conflict in the way aid money to Rwanda has perpetuated the conflict in DRC and the broader Great Lakes Region.

The number of peacekeeping missions established by the United Nations exploded beginning in 1991. This thesis argues the change may be explained by the shift in structure of the international system. The shift in the early 90s was not limited to the structure, but there was also a shift in the analysis of conflict, as described in Chapter One, that acknowledged new aspects of conflicts. The rise of non-state actors, changes in threats, and the increased recognition of ideas like identity and human security now accompany conceptualizations of conflict. The norms and expected behaviors of actors in the system shifted as the structure of the system shifted. One must remain open to the possibility that the shift in norms, roles, and behavior expectations cannot be explained by a structural shift. The cause of these changes, while not studied within this thesis, are possible alternatives to the argument made here. Norms, roles, and behavior expectations

[117] Emmanuel Hakizimana and Brian Endless, "Rwanda Today: When Foreign Aid Hurts More Than It Helps" (Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation, April 5, 2009), 2, http://hrrfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/RwandaTodayForeignAid.pdf.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Daily Press Briefing - October 3, 2013," Daily Press Briefing, *U.S. Department of State*, (October 3, 2013), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/215092.htm.

should be explored in other studies to examine their power to explain the shift in peacekeeping.

Two events in 1992 added further reforms that had significant effects on United Nations peacekeeping: the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN Secretariat, and the publication of *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. These two creations are again concepts that may be better explained by the other shifts of the early 1990s, and prompt explorations that are beyond the scope of this study, but deserve mentioning. The document was the result of the Security Council requesting that Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali write a document to frame and define peacekeeping moving forward from the Cold War. In June 1992, Boutros-Ghali presented the Security Council with *An Agenda for Peace*, which defined the next generation of peacekeeping activities as well as the work to be performed by DPKO. The international community seemed to embrace *An Agenda for Peace* with a hope for peacekeeping as the answer to conflict around the world. Early '90s peacekeeping soon squashed that optimism.

Early '90s peacekeeping supports the proposition that peacekeeping in a unipolar system will be more frequent and more robust according to the sole Superpower's interests. The extreme application of this, and drastic failures perceived, in the Balkans (1992), Somalia (1992, 1993), and Rwanda (1994) led to hesitancy by the U.S. and in the Security Council to use peacekeeping as tool to resolve conflict in situations where there was yet no peace to keep. Additionally, there were other changes that took place as the United States assumed the sole Superpower status. The avoidance of Security Council permanent members contributing troops for peacekeeping missions was relaxed and the US, Britain, and France took roles, not only as troop contributing countries, but as substantial leaders in missions. The United States took the leadership role in Somalia,

France took a leadership position in Rwanda, and NATO assumed a post-Cold War role in the Balkans. The UN also explored peacekeeping that did not strictly adhere to operating only under the consent of host parties.

In all of these new post-Cold War mandates, the Security Council still did not agree on, and likely was unconcerned with, establishing missions that had clear exit strategies. The threshold to mandate a peacekeeping mission was much higher by the time the second Congo War began in 1998: an agreement between and among parties to a conflict that demonstrated the political will to pursue peace was necessary. That threshold was not met until the parties to the second Congo War met in Lusaka and committed themselves to the Lusaka agreement. The commitment held within the agreement was sufficient for the UN to support it through a peacekeeping mission, but the lack of a well-planned exit strategy for the mission would prove the more cautious peacekeeping mission equally troubling.

MONUC

The second Congo War began as an affront to Laurent Kabila's rule in Congo and it was this desire to remove or protect his rule that continued the conflict. But it was Kabila who held the potential to end the conflict once the parties met in Lusaka, Zambia, and signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In August 1999, each of the major parties agreed to a standard demobilization and disarmament process, supervised national elections in DRC, and a UN peacekeeping mission to oversee the agreement. By the end of November 1999, the Security Council established MONUC with a core focus of restoring political security. MONUC's initial mandate was to provide technical assistance to the Ceasefire parties; to monitor and inform on the security conditions in DRC; to plan for the disengagement of forces, including disarmament, demobilization,

and reintegration (DDR); and to facilitate humanitarian aid and the provision of human rights.[120]

The Security Council meeting at which the mission was established with a vote of 15-0-0 was considerably different from the meeting that established ONUC. The meeting in July 1960 lasted well into the morning hours of the following day, covering nearly seven hours, while the meeting 30 November 1999 lasted five minutes.[121] This is not to suggest that there was absolute agreement among all Security Council members, including all permanent members, but does demonstrate the way in which the Security Council was less paralyzed in the unipolar system than it was in the bipolar system. As detailed by a former staff member of Egypt's mission to the UN, the work at the United Nations is increasingly conducted prior to official meetings removing debate and the airing of concerns of member states from UN official meeting records.[122] Arguably, and at least in part, it is because diplomatic relations among the permanent members had improved since the end of the Cold War that the business meetings of the Security Council no longer included considerable time for debate.

Kabila held the power to allow the UN into DRC to begin its mandate, but actively obstructed the deployment of UN peacekeepers.[123] Secretary General Annan met the difficulties of the situation by insisting that the deployment of MONUC peacekeepers be contingent upon conditions that must be met and sustained before moving to the next phase.[124] The mission was very slowly implemented until January 2001 when Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by one of his bodyguards, and his son Joseph assumed the role of President. The younger Kabila was more willing to allow the UN peacekeepers a role

[120] S/Res/1279 (1999), para. 5
[121] S/PV/873 and S/PV/4076.
[122] In a class with Dr. Namira Negm held at AUC in Spring 2012 (POLS 510 Global Governance and World Order(s)), she detailed her experiences working with the Egyptian mission to the UN multiple times including the anecdote detailed here.
[123] Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 271.
[124] Norrie MacQueen, *Peacekeeping and the International System* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 315.

in DRC, though it was still another two years before the mission was able to begin its work more earnestly.

MONUC is often broken into three distinct phases, the first occurring from 1999-2002, the second 2003-2006, and the third 2007-2010 ending when MONUC transitioned into MONUSCO. From 1999-2002, the mission was primarily focused on the tasks mandated by the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. As has been explained, this was made difficult by the uncooperative behavior of Laurent Kabila before his death. By February 2000, the Security Council handed the mission a stronger mandate that allowed MONUC peacekeepers to utilize "any means necessary" under Chapter VII to protect the mission, personnel representing the mission, and "civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[125] However, since the mission retained only small numbers of peacekeepers on the ground, the ability to protect civilians was meager at best.

The first phase of MONUC occurred as another framing document for United Nations peacekeeping was being created. In August 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping*, better known as the Brahimi Report, was published. The Brahimi Report encouraged peacekeeping missions to be premised on a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that would define expectations between and among parties to a conflict. This allowed more robust UN involvement in peacekeeping missions than had been permitted previously because an agreement between parties would already exist. It also allowed the UN to address its normative agenda through peacekeeping missions. However, the Brahimi Report proved to be too front loaded: the Report lacked considerations of conditions on the ground including the destruction of the political structure, lack of political will, diminished resources, and failing infrastructure. There was also a difficulty created by the fact that creating agreements with governments, but

[125] S/Res/1291 (1999), para. 8.

not the opposition parties, jeopardized neutrality and presumed impartiality. This was certainly evident with the implementation of MONUC after 2002: the original Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement needed to be renegotiated, and this difficult task resulted in the Pretoria Accord.

The Pretoria Accord, an agreement between the DRC and Rwandan governments, specifically acknowledged the role of the United Nations as a third party to assist in resolving the conflict in DRC. While the Accord was a significant step in resolving the conflict, it did not include all of the opposition groups involved in the conflict which created the perception that the UN is closer to the governments. The mediation role the UN could play in the broader conflict was undermined. The second phase of MONUC from 2003-2006 demonstrated the difficulties in peacekeeping that the Brahimi Report did not sufficiently address.

In 2003 and 2004, MONUC peacekeepers were bystanders to two major civilian massacres in Bunia and Bukavu. In response to the Bunia crisis, the European Union sent an Interim Emergency Multinational Force that reestablished security in Bunia during its three-month deployment. Following the massacre in Bukavu, the Security Council expanded the Chapter VII mandate to the entire territory of DRC and increased the number of peacekeepers in the country, although the number deployed by the Security Council was still significantly less than had been requested by the mission.[126] One of the major problems that manifested in MONUC, as with other peacekeeping missions, is the hesitancy of troop contributing countries to allow their troops to fight another country's war. There is an understandable aversion to allow innocent peacekeepers to die in a conflict in which they are considered neutral. Beginning in 2005, MONUC conducted operations in the Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga provinces against

[126] Denis M. Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 2 (2009): 218, doi:10.1080/13533310802685729.

militias, occasionally working with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).[127] However, by occasionally working with the FARDC, MONUC has been accused of overlooking and failing to protect civilians from the human rights violations conducted by the DRC national military.[128]

The MONUC mission focused on organizing the presidential, parliamentary, and provincial elections that took place in 2006. The Secretary General requested additional troops to be deployed during the elections, but the Security Council denied this request and the European Union stepped in to fill the void again. The elections took place and remained relatively peaceful, and in November 2006, results of the presidential runoff declared Joseph Kabila President. The third phase of MONUC involved the implementation of election decisions and, with that, evidence mounted that the mission still had not addressed the root causes of conflict in DRC. In 2007, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon submitted a report that called for a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping in DRC that included all major stakeholders, in a way the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and Pretoria Accord did not do. This led to a joint communiqué between DRC and Rwanda that pledged both countries to pursue a common approach to resolve the conflict and bring peace to the Great Lakes Region.[129] This communiqué, which came to fruition through the work of the UN, U.S., and European Union, committed to the removal and disarmament of illegal armed groups in Eastern Congo to be overseen by MONUC. The communiqué placed the mission in a position where it was required to plan operations against illegal militias in Eastern Congo, which would certainly place civilians at risk, while also expecting the mission to uphold its mandate to protect civilians.

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[127] James Sloan, "The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no. 5 (July 29, 2014): 695, doi:10.1080/01402390.2014.921853; Doss, "In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche," 716.
[128] Doss, "In the Footsteps of Dr Bunche," 716.
[129] Ibid., 719.

MONUSCO and the Intervention Brigade

MONUC, despite its cautious and deliberate conditions-based early implementation during its first phase from 1999-2002, became one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations in the history of UN peacekeeping. The mission lasted more than ten years, and attained a mix of successes and failures. Ultimately, MONUC, with its focus on DDR of foreign militias and protection of civilians, gave way to MONUSCO. MONUSCO was intended to begin a drawdown of UN peacekeeping forces in DRC but soon found itself confronted with familiar issues like the rise of M23, a rebel group that mutinied against the FARDC, in April 2012. Nearly a year later, the Security Council, in an unprecedented resolution, created an Intervention Brigade that, for the first time in UN peacekeeping, carried with it an offensive mandate.[130] M23 would be the first rebel militia targeted by the Intervention Brigade.

The Intervention Brigade assisted in the November 2013 defeat of M23 by gathering and providing information to the FARDC. The Intervention Brigade, a 3,069 strong force made up of three Infantry Battalions, an Artillery Battalion, a Special Forces Company, and a Reconnaissance Company, was not authorized to increase MONUSCO's overall personnel.[131] Even though the number of MONUSCO peacekeepers on the ground did not change, the strength of the Intervention Brigade proved successful for its mandate. The most significant factor in the success of the Intervention Brigade is that the FARDC was empowered to take the lead for the fighting necessary to remove M23 from their strongholds. FARDC does not have a spotless record in the conflict in DRC and the UN has received critique for working with the Congolese military despite the evidence of their human rights abuses. However, the FARDC received a boost of confidence and

[130] S/Res/2098 (2013).
[131] Clement Namangale, "Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *Prism* 5, no. 2 (2015): 78.

took on added professionalism in the operations they completed with the assistance of the Intervention Brigade. By working with the FARDC to defeat M23, MONUSCO's Intervention Brigade worked to combat a rebel militia causing chaos and destruction in eastern DRC, and also was able to improve the competence and effectiveness of the DRC's military.

To assist the FARDC, the Intervention Brigade used unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to collect information over eastern DRC, a first for UN peacekeeping.[132] According to Under-Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, the UN hopes for MONUSCO to use UAVs to monitor relevant areas in DRC permanently as "flying cameras."[133] At this time, there is no reason to suspect UAVs would be used by the UN for anything other than reconnaissance and surveillance, but the success of UAVs in DRC could result in their use in other missions. While the use of UAVs to collect information had positive effects in DRC, there should be concern within the UN about the ways in which surveillance and reconnaissance through UAVs may affect a conflict setting. The perception of the UN's impartiality and neutrality, while up for debate more recently, must be balanced according to the situation. Collecting information is not of itself dangerous for the UN, but the sharing of that information requires more delicacy. Even the M23 considered a preemptive strike against the Intervention Brigade because of the threat the Brigade posed against them.[134]

The Intervention Brigade aided the defeat of M23, but other factors contributed as well. For example, the UN and DRC government have both accused Rwanda for

[132] "DRC Sets Precedents for UN Forces," *Strategic Comments* 20, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): i – ii, doi:10.1080/13567888.2014.899738.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Naomi Kok, "From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-Led Negotiation to the Intervention Brigade," *African Security Review* 22, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 178, doi:10.1080/10246029.2013.823793.

providing support and reinforcements to M23.[135] Rwandan President Paul Kagame was pressured by the international community to stop his assistance to M23 which is also credited with assisting in the defeat of the rebel militia. As stated earlier, Rwanda continued to get aid money from the United States until this was slowed in 2013 because of the support Rwanda gave to M23 and M23's use of child soldiers.[136] By slowing the aid, the United States was supporting the peacekeeping mission's goal of combatting M23 specifically, and the rebel militias more generally, as well as providing support to the Intervention Brigade. It would be an oversimplification to say U.S. pressure on Rwanda was motivated in whole by a desire for the Intervention Brigade to succeed, but the potential political and diplomatic nightmare that would follow the Brigade's failure must be acknowledged for the pressure this would apply to the international community's only Superpower.

Reimagining MONUC and MONUSCO: The Multipolar Structure

It is not as easy to determine the way in which situations occurring in DRC between 1999 and today would have been different in a multipolar structure. Olson argues that small groups of unequal size are the most likely to have a collective good provided at closest to optimal levels. The Security Council in a unipolar structure is the closest the Security Council can get to a small group of unequal size. The best conjecture that can be made is that the collective good supplied in DRC would have been far less significant in a multipolar structure: the mandates would not have been as robust and the Chapter VII allowances would likely not have been instated.

It is likely that the additional Superpowers would be China, Germany, or one or more of the BRICS countries. The ability of any of these countries to more forcefully

[135] "DRC Sets Precedents for UN Forces"; Namangale, "Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," 77.
[136] Department Of State, "Daily Press Briefing - October 3, 2013."

advance their individual interests in DRC would change UN peacekeeping on the ground in extraordinary ways. China's interest in Africa, for example, is mainly economic[137] which differs from the U.S. interest of political stability. This is not to argue that China's interest is only economic, but to show that China's interests differ from that of the U.S. The same could be said for Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa; the interests in DRC specifically and Africa in general are different for the current Superpower and the rising powers that would most logically form the Great Powers of a multipolar structure. The rise of South Africa would certainly change the political landscape in Africa and the ability of Superpowers to pursue their interests on the continent.

Similar to ONUC, it is possible that MONUC would never have been established if the same situation had occurred in a multipolar structure. As argued in Chapter Four, the road to MONUC began in Rwanda. The Civil War in Rwanda and Rwandan genocide would have been handled very differently in a multipolar structure where at least one Superpower would have an interest in intervening in the conflict sooner than what occurred in the unipolar structure. By changing the course of events in Rwanda, a multipolar structure would face a radically different situation in the Great Lakes Region as the 21st century began: it is possible that Mobutu would never have been removed from power and the Democratic Republic of Congo would still be Zaire.

For the sake of argument, however, imagine that MONUC had been mandated in a multipolar structure. The five minute meeting that established the mission with a 15-0-0 vote in the unipolar structure would have lasted notably longer in a multipolar structure, and there would likely have been abstentions from at least one country, not to mention the

[137] Jianwei Wang and Jing Zou, "China Goes to Africa: A Strategic Move?," *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 90 (November 2, 2014): 1113–32, doi:10.1080/10670564.2014.898902; Jonathan Holslag, "China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa," *African Affairs* 110, no. 440 (July 1, 2011): 367–86, doi:10.1093/afraf/adr022; Piet Konings, "China and Africa Building a Strategic Partnership," *Journal of Developing Societies* 23, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 341–67, doi:10.1177/0169796X0702300303; Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong, "Friends and Interests: China's Distinctive Links with Africa," *African Studies Review* 50, no. 3 (2007): 75–114.

threat of veto from more powerful permanent members. A multipolar structure, like the bipolar structure, would require more bargaining and debate to come to agreements on resolutions and peacekeeping mandates. It is also likely that these arrangements would contain more ambiguous language that will leave the resolution open to a wide range of interpretations. Peacekeeping missions in a multipolar environment would suffer from unclear mandates and assignment of ambiguous tasks. The Security Council would fall farther from providing the optimal level of collective action to benefit the whole, and it is doubtful any of the individual member states would receive anything close to their desired amount of benefit. This suboptimal collective action is evident even before any member state is expected to contribute funds, supplies, or troops. The application of Olson's theory suggests that the necessary funds, supplies, and troops will be just as difficult to secure as the mandate was.

Turning to MONUSCO, assuming it would have ever existed in a multipolar structure, the Intervention Brigade would never have been mandated. The Intervention Brigade would not be mandated in any structure other than the unipolar structure. Without the robust mandate of the Intervention Brigade, the UN would be unable to address the security threats that exist because of the rebel groups and militias active in eastern DRC. Collective action through the UN would be nearly impossible at the level it is being implemented now. It is more likely that individual states with a strong interest in defeating these rebel groups would form a coalition of the willing to address the problem rather than work for consensus in the Security Council. The UN would be bypassed more in a multipolar structure for unilateral or bilateral action by Superpowers working closer in alliances than a universal collective.

Early missions in the post-Cold War period included significantly expanded mandates and activities, as detailed in the second chapter. Missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrate the trends exhibited by unipolar peacekeeping, and as compared to ONUC in the bipolar system, the DRC is still home to experiments in and testing new approaches for UN peacekeeping. The creation of the Intervention Brigade would have been unthinkable in the bipolar environment, but with the shift in structure to a single Superpower, there is less ability to counter the power exerted by the strongest state in the international system. As unfathomable the Intervention Brigade may have been 25 years ago, it was renewed for a second year through 31 March 2015.

Moving forward in the unipolar structure, UN Peacekeeping will soon have its third framing document written since the structure shifted in the early 1990s. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon created a High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations in October 2014.[138] The fourteen-member panel, at the time this thesis was written, is still conducting research, travelling to gather information from UN member states, and preparing to draft its assessment of UN peace operations expected to be published in time for the 2015 General Debate. The Panel will travel to Washington, DC, where panel members will meet with U.S. government officials, members of Congress, and relevant experts.[139] It should not be a surprise that the meetings held for the panel in the U.S. capital will seek to influence the findings and recommendations of the Panel's assessment according to U.S. interests. It is likely that, because of the position the U.S. holds in the international system, the Panel's meetings in Washington will have a stronger link to the assessment, further solidifying the power held by the Superpower in a unipolar structure.

[138] "Secretary-General's Statement on Appointment of High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations," *United Nations Secretary General*, October 31, 2014, http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8151.

[139] I am tasked with assisting in the event planning for the Panel's public event in Washington, DC, which allows me the knowledge of the Panel's agenda for their trip. Information for the Panel's public event is available at http://www.usip.org/events/the-future-of-un-peace-operations.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis is to explain how changes in the international structure affect United Nations peacekeeping operations. The preceding chapters offered details to support that the increase of peacekeeping operations beginning in 1991 is a result of the shift in the international system from the bipolar to unipolar structure. The change in the international structure affected UN peacekeeping missions by allowing peacekeeping to be used more often and with more strength than was previously allowed in the bipolar structure. As the structure of the international system changes in the future, peacekeeping will be further affected by the actions allowed within the system. All of this is because the UN, an international organization including most of the system's actors and operating at the system level, is vulnerable to the will and interests of its member states. The UN exists and operates only as far as its member states will allow.

The bipolar structure influenced UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War by requiring the cooperation of the two consequential powers. If either the U.S. or Soviet Union did not want the UN to address a conflict or threat to international peace and security, the UN would not be able to take action. The requirement of unanimity in the Security Council forced the U.S. and Soviet Union to cooperate in situations where neither country trusted the other. At times, the UN could serve as a buffer to alleviate the trust deficit, as was the case in addressing President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba's request for assistance from the Secretary General. However, this buffer capability was still flawed in the way ONUC's mandate was implemented. The ambiguous language in Security Council resolutions left both sides unhappy; a good example are the two military operations Force Commander O'Brien led to address the Katanga secession. The Soviet Union felt the operations did not go far enough to advance the mandate and the U.S. thought the action was too strong. Peacekeeping in the

Cold War remained susceptible to Great Power interests, but allowed collective action when those interests converged.

In the lead up to the Soviet Union's dissolve in 1992, the distribution of capabilities and the balance of those capabilities at the top of the system shifted. None of the states formed out of the Soviet Union were strong enough to challenge or counter the strength of the United States. Russia was the strongest of the former Soviet states, but did not have the economic, political, or military strength to maintain Great Power status. The international system's structure became unipolar which changed the dynamics of the UN and the operating procedures in the Security Council. Diplomacy between the U.S. and former Soviet states continued to improve and, although agreements were not guaranteed, the improved relations among the units of the international system allowed for increased collective action.

The change in the structure further affected the interactions of the U.S. and former Soviet states within their spheres of influence. There were no longer areas of the world where the "unambiguous predominant interests" of one Superpower took priority over the interest of international peace and security. States that served the needs of a Superpower during the Cold War now found themselves in situations where their loyalty to one bloc was no longer valued. This was certainly the case in Zaire, which had remained closer to the U.S. through the end of the Cold War. When the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to the U.S., Zaire and other countries were not as important to contain and keep close. Despite Mobutu's loyalty to the U.S. in the last two and a half decades of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer had an interest in protecting his rule or preventing civil conflict. Zaire and other states that had grown dependent on a Cold War Superpower's strength were suddenly thrust into a deeper level of anarchic self-help. Conflict increased and the

international system, led by a single Superpower was able to address these conflicts only as far as it met the Superpower's individual interests.

The increased collective action as a result of improved relations among Security Council P5 members changed peacekeeping missions and allowed the significant increase in their use to address conflict around the world. Peacekeeping operations grew in number and tasks, but in reality could only fulfill missions that truly had the support of the U.S. The U.S. had an interest in preserving the international structure that recognized one nation as a Great Power, and took action at the system level in the attempt to protect its position. Political theory and the actions taken suggest two major problems with the U.S. working to preserve the unipolar structure. First, structure cannot be controlled or affected by any unit in the system. The structure of the international system stands independent of the actions and will of the states contained within it. Second, the individual interests of the U.S. always trump the interests of the system.

Peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period started with a large number of robust mandates that UN member states were not prepared to support. The U.S. and its allies stepped in to provide collective security through peacekeeping, but soon were met with failures that more forcefully caused the Great Power to focus on its individual interests. While the number of peacekeeping missions remains high, and mandates are more robust, the actions of the U.S. to support peacekeeping through the Security Council do not always coincide with the actions of the U.S. to advance its individual interests. This is evident by the monetary aid given to Kagame's Rwanda to promote stability without attaching expectations for or condemning Rwanda's involvement and support in perpetuating the conflict in Congo.

We can learn from the exploration of peacekeeping in the bipolar and unipolar structures to predict how it would function in a multipolar structure. Assuming Great

Powers would still lack trust and be discouraged from cooperation, it is more likely that peacekeeping in a multipolar structure would resemble bipolar peacekeeping more than unipolar. Diplomatic relations would be more strained and communication would involve more debate. Great Powers would have the power to prevent collective action when they do not see it in their best interest. Bargaining would increase compared to the unipolar structure, and alliances would occasionally form to encourage some level of collective action. However, the UN would be increasingly paralyzed to operate in the international system because the United Nations exists only as far as its member states allow it. With more Superpowers in the system, the UN would receive less political and economic support because it is more in the Great Powers' interests to retain their political and economic power.

Finally, the three missions focused on modern DRC support the theories presented in this work about the number and scope of peacekeeping missions as determined by system structure. In any structure, mandates are subject to the interests of the Superpowers, however many exist. The Great Powers in a bipolar structure will only agree to the employment of peacekeeping in three possible instances: first, if the Superpowers recognize "mutually strong interests;" second, if the Superpowers recognize one has "unambiguous predominant interests;" and third, if the risk attached to failure to cooperate is higher than either is willing to take. ONUC presented an instance when the Superpowers recognized mutually strong interests, and also an environment where the risk posed by a lack of cooperation would have been higher than either would be willing to accept. Both Superpowers were looking for a way to pull African states into their spheres of influence and Congo presented an attractive entry. To avoid the Cold War conflict escalating as a result of interests in Congo, the U.S. and Soviet Union recognized mutually strong interests and attempted to influence the situation through the multilateral

action of the UN. This cooperation, as imperfect as it was, fits the third instance as well. The failure to cooperate in addressing the conflict in Congo could have resulted in escalation of the broader Cold War conflict, a turn of events neither Superpower would have wanted.

The unipolar structure, as evident from the data in Chapter Two, will have more peacekeeping missions with more robust mandates. In the unipolar structure, the Superpower's interests can often dictate multilateral action, at times through coercion because the Superpower would be able to act unilaterally or through a coalition of the willing even if the multilateral organization tries to stop it. Intergovernmental organizations in a unipolar structure are at a higher risk of becoming a tool of the Superpower to advance its interests than in any other structure.

Lessons learned from Congo show that the missions and mandates in a unipolar structure may not be substantive in the pursuit of international peace and security, but rather feed rhetoric. MONUSCO now is receiving the funding and support DPKO requests, but that was not always the case. The U.S. supported peacekeeping in DRC rhetorically, but has only recently stepped up its commitment to combatting all the elements that contribute to the conflict. A sole Superpower will use the tool of peacekeeping to advance its diplomatic or humanitarian interests at the system level, but the national interests, specifically economic and political, will trump group interests.

The prediction made in this work is that peacekeeping in a multipolar structure will be more similar to peacekeeping in the bipolar structure. This prediction is based on neo-realist theory and Mancur Olson's theory of collective action. The reimagining of situations on the ground in Congo in each of the three peacekeeping missions the country has hosted strengthens the argument that the multipolar structure will produce fewer missions with weaker mandates. Superpowers will still fight for individual interests

above collective interests, but the lack of trust will be greater and attached to more risk making cooperation more rare.

These propositions and the argument that the structure of the international system affects UN peacekeeping missions can be used by the UN and lesser powers to present peacekeeping opportunities in ways that a Superpower interprets as advancing its individual interests. The UN and states whose interests include promoting peace and security through UN peacekeeping need to attract the interest of the U.S. where no national interest is seen. This does not limit these states to targeting U.S. interests only but can be accomplished by raising awareness through partners of the U.S. As the international system increasingly moves toward a multipolar structure, the UN can prepare for fewer missions by focusing on the strengths developed in their practice of peacekeeping. As trust and cooperation decline, the UN serves the collective good by ensuring that when it is called to implement a peacekeeping mandate, its success can increase cooperation by acting as a third party trusted and supported by member states and parties to a conflict alike.

Despite the findings and suggestions of this work, there is further study that should be done to address lingering questions. It has already been acknowledged that other shifts occurred in the early 1990s, but it cannot conclusively be said these shifts in norms, behaviors, and roles are a result of the shift in structure. It is possible that these shifts could explain better the increased use of UN peacekeeping to address threats to international peace and security. This thesis offers one possible explanation, but others still need to be explored more fully to advance the ideas of causes of conflict and causes of peace.

Appendix A – Table of Interstate vs. Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions

Interstate Conflict during the Cold War	**Intrastate Conflict during the Cold War**
1956: UNEF I (Egypt, Israel, France, United Kingdom) 1958: UNOGIL (Lebanon, United Arab Republic) 1960: ONUC (Republic of the Congo, Belgium)‡ 1962: UNSF (Indonesia, the Netherlands) 1963: UNYOM (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic) 1964: UNFICYP (Cyprus, United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey) 1965: UNIPOM (India, Pakistan) 1973: UNEF II (Egypt, Syria, Israel) 1974: UNDOF (Syria, Israel) 1978: UNIFIL (Lebanon, Israel) 1988: UNGOMAP (Afghanistan, Pakistan) 1989: UNAVEM I (Angola, Cuba) 1989: UNTAG (Namibia, South Africa) 1989: ONUCA (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua)	1965: DOMREP (Dominican Republic)
Interstate Conflict after the Cold War	**Intrastate Conflict after the Cold War**
1991: UNIKOM (Iraq, Kuwait) 1991: MINURSO (Western Sahara, Morocco) 1992: UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) 1993: UNOMUR (Uganda, Rwanda) 1994: UNASOG (Chad, Libya) 1995: UNCRO (Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) 1995: UNPREDEP (Macedonia, Yugoslavia, Albania) 1995: UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Croatia) 1996: UNMOP (Croatia, Yugoslavia) 1999: UNMIK (Kosovo, Yugoslavia) 1999: UNTAET (East Timor, Indonesia) 1999: MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe) 2000: UNMEE (Ethiopia, Eritrea) 2007: NIMURCAT (Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan) 2011: UNISFA (Sudan, South Sudan)	1991: UNAVEM II (Angola) 1991: ONUSAL (El Salvador) 1991: UNAMIC (Cambodia) 1992: UNTAC (Cambodia) 1992: UNISOM I (Somalia) 1992: ONUMOZ (Mozambique) 1993: UNISOM II (Somalia) 1993: UNOMIG (Georgia) 1993: UNOMIL (Liberia) 1993: UNMIH (Haiti) 1993: UNAMIR (Rwanda) 1994: UNMOT (Tajikistan) 1995: UNAVEM III (Angola) 1996: UNTAES (Croatian regions of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium) 1996: UNSMIH (Haiti) 1997: MINUGUA (Guatemala) 1997: MONUA (Angola) 1997: UNTMIH (Haiti) 1997: MIPONUH (Haiti) 1998: UNCPSG (Croatia) 1998: MINURCA (Central African Republic) 1998: UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone) 1999: UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone) 2002: UNMISET (East Timor [Timor-Leste]) 2003: UNMIL (Liberia) 2004: UNOCI (Cote d'Iviore) 2004: MINUSTAH (Haiti) 2004: ONUB (Burundi) 2005: UNMIS (Sudan) 2006: UNMIT (Timor-Leste) 2007: UNAMID (Sudan) 2010: MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) 2011: UNMISS (South Sudan) 2012: UNSMIS (Syria) 2013: MINUSMA (Mali) 2014: MINUSCA (Central African Republic)

**All categorizations are based on the resolution passed by the Security Council that established the mission.

Appendix B – Table of Peacekeeping Missions 1956-2014

Mission Name	Acronym	Mandated	Completed
First United Nations Emergency Force	UNEF I	November 1956	June 1967
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	UNOGIL	June 1958	December 1958
United Nations Operation in the Congo	ONUC	July 1960	June 1964
United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea	UNSF	October 1962	April 1963
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	UNYOM	July 1963	September 1964
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	UNFICYP	March 1964	
Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	DOMREP	May 1965	October 1966
United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	UNIPOM	September 1965	March 1966
Second United Nations Emergency Force	UNEF II	October 1973	July 1979
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	UNDOF	June 1974	
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	UNIFIL	March 1978	
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP	May 1988	March 1990
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	UNIIMOG	August 1988	February 1991
United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	UNAVEM I	January 1989	June 1991
United Nations Transition Assistance Group	UNTAG	April 1989	March 1990
United Nations Observer Group in Central America	ONUCA	November 1989	January 1992
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	UNIKOM	April 1991	October 2003
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	MINURSO	April 1991	
United Nations Angola Verification Mission II	UNAVEM II	June 1991	February 1995
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	ONUSAL	July 1991	April 1995
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	UNAMIC	October 1991	March 1992
United Nations Protection Force	UNPROFOR	February 1992	March 1995
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	UNTAC	March 1992	September 1993
United Nations Operation in Somalia I	UNISOM I	April 1992	March 1993
United Nations Operation in Mozambique	ONUMOZ	December 1992	December 1994
United Nations Operation in Somalia II	UNISOM II	March 1993	March 1995
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	UNOMUR	June 1993	September 1994
United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia	UNOMIG	August 1993	June 2009
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	UNOMIL	September 1993	September 1997
United Nations Mission in Haiti	UNMIH	September 1993	June 1996
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	UNAMIR	October 1993	March 1996
United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group	UNASOG	May 1994	June 1994
United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	UNMOT	December 1994	May 2000
United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	UNAVEM III	February 1995	June 1997
United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	UNCRO	May 1995	January 1996
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	UNPREDEP	March 1995	February 1999
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH	December 1995	December 2002
United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	UNTAES	January 1996	January 1998
United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	UNMOP	January 1996	December 2002
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	UNSMIH	July 1996	July 1997
United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	MINUGUA	January 1997	May 1997
United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	MONUA	June 1997	February 1999
United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	UNTMIH	August 1997	December 1997
United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	MIPONUH	December 1997	March 2000
UN Civilian Police Support Group	UNCPSG	January 1998	October 1998
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic	MINURCA	April 1998	February 2000
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL	July 1998	October 1999
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	UNMIK	June 1999	

Mission Name	Acronym	Mandated	Completed
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	October 1999	December 2005
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	UNTAET	October 1999	May 2002
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUC	November 1999	June 2010
United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	UNMEE	July 2000	July 2008
United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	UNMISET	May 2002	May 2005
United Nations Mission in Liberia	UNMIL	September 2003	
United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire	UNOCI	April 2004	
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	MINUSTAH	June 2004	
United Nations Operation in Burundi	ONUB	June 2004	December 2006
United Nations Mission in the Sudan	UNMIS	March 2005	July 2011
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT	August 2006	December 2012
African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UNAMID	July 2007	
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	MINURCAT	September 2007	December 2010
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	MONUSCO	July 2010	
United Nations Organization Interim Security Force for Abyei	UNISFA	June 2011	
United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan	UNMISS	July 2011	
United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria	UNSMIS	April 2012	August 2012
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali	MINUSMA	April 2013	
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic	MINUSCA	April 2014	

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